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Abstract 
 
Utilisation of Health IT to support care management and delivery is prevalent within the NHS 
but whilst it is safety related in nature it falls outside of scope of the medical device 
regulations.   
Two national standards first published in 2009, addressing clinical risk management of Health 
IT in the NHS, establish a hazard centric approach to clinical risk management.  However, it is 
considered that the concept of a hazard is not well understood and where it is used it rarely 
reflects or captures the patient safety consequences that could occur. 
If the approach to clinical risk management as established in the standards is to be effective 
then there is a need, at the start of the risk management process, to be able to describe and 
communicate hazard descriptions that: reflect the harm-scenario, are relative to the care-
pathway and focus on the credible patient harm outcome.    There is also a need to recognise 
that Health IT cannot be considered in isolation; it forms a constituent element of a socio-
technical system, forming a fundamental element of health informatics. 
This research establishes a framework which uses simple language constructs, recognising the 
socio-technical context in which they exist to establish hazard descriptions that capture the 
characteristics discussed above. 
The framework has been evaluated through a series of different activities: application to 
legacy hazards; review by clinical safety officers; conference presentation & workshop; pilot 
study in a secondary care setting and training course delivery and evaluation.  The conclusions 
of the evaluations converge to indicate that the framework is effective in establishing 
meaningful hazard descriptions and that it is a practical tool that can be used. 
Further work is on-going to establish the framework in NHS Digital’s clinical risk management 
training programme, providing a nationally available “how to guide” and publishing 
complimentary implementation guidance to support the two clinical risk management 
standards. 
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1 Introduction 
 Research Motivation 
Information Technology (IT) is embedded within health and social care delivery organisations 
throughout the world.  Initiatives such as the National Programme for IT (NPfIT) (Hassey, 2005) 
launched by the Labour UK Government provided centrally funded health care systems and 
services to the NHS. Analysis of spending by American health care providers indicates $7.1 
billion was spent on Health IT services and systems during 2017 (Splitzer, 2018).  
Healthcare providers are motivated to utilise Health IT to realise operational efficiencies and 
better patient outcomes.  The move to electronic based medicine prescribing and 
administration was shown to reduce serious errors by at least 50% (Bates, 2000) and findings 
from literature review indicates that the benefits of using of Health IT is considered to have a 
positive outcome in 62% of cases (Beeuwkes Buntin, et al., 2011). 
However, the use of Health IT has the potential to compromise patient safety outcomes.  A 
recent inspection of a National Health Service (NHS) Trust by the Care Quality Commission 
(CQC)1 identified the potential for harm to occur to patients due to incomplete or missing 
electronic patient health records (CQC, 2016). Independent research conducted following the 
implementation of a Health IT system within the NHS illustrates a perceived increase in risk of 
patient harm (Clarke, et al., 2016).  In the US, the ECRI Institute2 established that during 2016, 
IT was cited as a cause of 2 of the top 10 technology hazards (ECRI Institute, 2015).  
A recent study of current safety assurance practice in the domain (Habli, et al., 2018) 
concluded that ‘Significant effort is still needed to develop and evaluate practical techniques 
and tools …. that help clinicians and engineers generate and explain the HIT safety evidence to 
the required level of rigour, detail and clarity’.  This conclusion was established through 
qualitative observation and opinion expressed within the context of three workshops that 
were run by the authors.  The workshops were attended by clinical and engineering risk 
management practitioners and their views on current practice were elicited by asking 
questions pertaining to key clinical risk management activities. This particular conclusion aligns 
with my own personal reflections working as a Safety Engineer within NHS Digital3, where I 
have formed an opinion that there is an opportunity to improve the state of best practice with 
respect to safety management of Health IT.  
 Research Scope 
The general scope of this research and its practical application has been targeted at health and 
social care organisations, e.g. secondary care hospitals and General Practitioners (GP), that are 
funded by NHS England to manage and administer care.  The rationale for this being that: 
 
1 CQC is the independent regulator of health and adult social care in England.  They are responsible for 
ensuring that health and social care services provide people with safe, effective, compassionate, high-
quality care and encourage care services to improve. https://www.cqc.org.uk/about-us 
 
2 ECRI Institute is a US based independent and trusted authority on healthcare practices and products 
that improve the safety, quality, and cost-effectiveness of patient care. https://www.ecri.org/about/ 
 
3 NHS Digital is the national provider of information, data and IT systems for commissioners, analysts 
and clinicians in health and social care. They work with partners across the health and social care system 
to ensure information flows efficiently and securely. https://digital.nhs.uk/ 
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a) The UK Government has declared to transform the NHS, making it paperless by 2020 
(UK Government, 2014) and thereby committing to the wholesale adoption and 
implementation of digital and information technologies. 
b) Additionally, the UK Government has committed to integrate health and social care 
domains (UK Government, 2015) which will inarguably utilise digital and information 
technologies to achieve this. 
c) The Clinical Risk Management (CRM) standard, DCB 0160 (NHS Digital, 2018), 
mandates, under the Health and Social Care Act 2012, that organisations must conduct 
clinical risk management in support of the deployment and use of Health IT systems.   
d) Care delivery organisations are under financial pressures with an on-going trend of a 
significant numbers of Trusts being in deficit (The Kings Fund, 2018) so there is an 
incentive to provide innovation that will improve competency and effectiveness.   
e) Different countries operate different health delivery models4. It was considered that 
the breadth of different operational context and different governance frameworks 
could introduce a risk to the research in that a convergent research recommendation 
could not be made. 
As is further discussed at Section 2.2, the NHS has established a clinical risk management 
system to support the safe development and use of Health IT in England.   This has been 
achieved through the publication of two complimentary standards DCB 0129 and DCB 0160.  
The specific focus of this research has been targeted to support the activity of Clinical Hazard 
Identification which is managed through Requirement 4.3 of both standards and is depicted in 
Figure 1.  Further, this focus aligns with a key participant recommendation made in (Habli, et 
al., 2018) to “Develop guidance on the necessary clinical and engineering expertise needed for 
hazard identification”. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Hazard Identification in Context (taken from DCB 0160) 
 
4 Care delivery in NHS England is based on the Beveridge model where care is funded by central 
Government and is provided free of charge at the point of care.  In Europe, care is based on the 
Bismarck model which is funded by a combination of central funding and private insurance whilst in USA 
care is almost always provided by private insurance. 
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It is important to recognise that the hazards associated with the use of Health IT cannot be 
identified and considered in isolation; the technology forms one element of a socio-technical 
system in which people, technology and information are inter-related and inter-dependant 
(Berg, 1999). Consequently, the term Health Informatics (HI) is used to reflect this eco-system 
and is used here-on-in within this thesis. The concept of HI is further discussed at Section 2.3. 
The findings of this research have not been considered in the context of applicability to those 
technologies that are classed as Medical Devices (MD) i.e. those that are certificated under the 
Medical Device Directive (MDD ) (EEC, 1993) or the replacement Medical Device Regulations 
(MDR) (EU, 2017).   The MDD and MDR establish specific requirements that must be addressed 
by a manufacturer5 before a MD can be placed on market; it is feasible that the findings of this 
research may be of benefit in that process but that would be subject to further evaluation.  
The distinction between Health IT and MD is further discussed in Section 2.2 
 
 Research Objectives 
There are two principal objectives associated with this research.   
The first objective (1.3i) is, in the context of the observation drawn from (Habli, et al., 2018) 
and discussed above, to understand the challenges health organisations encounter in trying to 
comply with Requirement 4.3 of DCB 0160 i.e. the definition of HI related hazards.   
The second objective (1.3ii) is to, building on this understanding, devise a methodology to 
assist organisations in addressing Requirement 4.3 of DCB 0160 which will support the 
meaningful definition of HI-related hazards.   
Application of this methodology will ensure that hazards can be described in a systematic way 
such that the contextual significance of the hazard can be articulated and inform the 
subsequent risk analysis activities.  
The methodology will also be expressed as a set of functional requirements to support the 
potential mechanisation of the methodology (i.e. tool support). 
The research objectives will be achieved by fulfilling the following activities (note the related 
objective is identified in ()): 
a) Understanding and evaluating current practice with respect to hazard identification in 
the domain of HI (1.3i); 
b) Understanding and evaluating current practice with respect to hazard identification in 
other safety related and safety critical industries (1.3i); 
c) Deriving a methodology that addresses observed deficiencies in current hazard 
definition activities in the domain of HI (1.3ii); 
d) Applying and evaluating the methodology in the context of existing hazard definitions 
(1.3ii); and 
e) Applying and evaluating the methodology in support of new or imminent Health IT 
systems deployments (1.3ii). 
 
  
 
5 Under medical device legislation (EU, 2017)] a manufacture is defined as “‘natural or legal person who 
manufactures or fully refurbishes a device or has a device designed, manufactured or fully refurbished, 
and markets that device under its name or trademark.” 
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 Research Methodology 
The research aim will be realised through the application of a four-stage research 
methodology: 
1.4.1 Literature Review 
A literature review will be conducted to establish an understanding of the state of current 
practice of hazard identification in both the health domain and in other safety related and 
safety critical domains.  The review will further support an understanding of challenges 
organisations face and examine tools and processes that are used in hazard identification 
activities. 
1.4.2 Domain Survey 
A domain survey, targeted at health organisations, will be conducted to establish whether the 
findings of the literature review align with the views and thoughts of HCPs that are responsible 
for addressing the requirements of DCB 0160. 
Work conducted in 1.4.1 & 1.4.2 will result in the development of a hazard identification 
methodology, specifically targeted to support the health domain. 
1.4.3 Retrospective Application 
The methodology will be applied to legacy and existing hazard logs and safety cases.  A 
qualitative evaluation will be made as to whether the methodology improves the description 
and understanding of the hazards.  This evaluation will be reviewed and appraised by Clinical 
Safety Officers6 (CSO). 
1.4.4 Formative Application 
The methodology will be applied to support the deployment of new or modified Health IT 
systems.  A qualitative evaluation will be made as to whether the methodology improves the 
description and understanding of the hazards.  This evaluation will be conducted by CSOs. 
  
 
6 DCB 0160 establishes the role of a CSO.  The CSO needs to be professionally qualified, registered and 
experienced and acts on behalf of the organisation to ensure the requirements of DCB 0160 are 
addressed. 
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 Thesis Structure 
The structure and organisation of this thesis is presented and summarised in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Thesis Structure 
1
• Introduction
• This section provides a declaration of the research motivation, 
outlines the research scope and  aims and an outline of the 
thesis structure.
2
• Literature Review
• This section establishes the state of current practice of HI hazard 
assessment both within the NHS and internationally.  It criticaly 
reviews strengthens and weakness in current practice of hazard 
definition within NHS England and considers if practice in other 
domains offers oppurtunities for improvement.
• Supports Research Activities  1.3 a,b, c
3
• Survey
• This section establishes a domain specific questionnaire 
targetted to support anomonous, qualatitive assessment of 
awareness, understanding and competency of hazard 
assessment in HI deploying organisations.
• Supports Research Activities  1.3 a,b, c
4
• Hazard Definition Framework
• This section describes the hazard definition framework .
• Supports Research Activities  1.3 c
5
• Hazard Definition Framework Evaluation
• This section presents the findings and conclusion of application 
of the framework both retrospectivly in the context of previously 
defined HI hazards and pro-actively in the context of support to 
new Health IT system deployments.  Evaluation includes 
independent clinical opinion. 
• Supports Research Activities  1.3 d
6
• Conclusions & further work
• This section summarises the significant findings of the research, 
identifies oppurtunties for application and also oppurtunties for 
continuation of this research.
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2 Literature Review 
 Introduction 
This literature review: 
• establishes the different classification and regulatory frameworks that apply to 
software-based technologies that are developed for and used within the NHS; 
• focuses on the emergent use of IT for health care purposes and establishes that it 
forms part of socio-technical ecosystem within the health domain; 
• illustrates that Health IT is safety related and can credibly cause or contribute to 
patient harm 
• provides an overview of generic safety management principles and discusses the 
approach to safety management within the health domain; 
• focuses on hazard identification activities and reflects on the current state of practice 
within the NHS and compares this with practice in other domains. 
• Formalise the specific research question that is addressed by this thesis. 
 Technology Classifications in the Health 
Domain 
2.2.1 Medical Devices 
In 1993 the Medical Device Directive (MDD) 93/42/EEC was established in statute and created 
a harmonised regulatory frameworki across the EU (European Union) through which products 
intended to be used in or on the human body had to be certificated by the manufacturer of the 
product.  Such certificated products are formally classed as medical devices (MD) and are 
denoted by the CE7 mark.  The MDD provides the following formal definition of a MD:  
‘an instrument, apparatus, appliance, material or other article, whether used alone or 
in combination, together with any software necessary for its proper application, which 
– 
a) is intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of 
i. diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease, 
ii. diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an 
injury or handicap, 
iii. investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a 
physiological process, or control of conception; and 
b) Does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by 
pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means’ 
 
 
7 Derived from the French phrase Conformite Europeene which means European Conformity the CE 
mark is used by a manufacturer to declare that their product complies with the essential requirements 
of the relevant European health, safety and environmental protection legislation.  There are more than 
20 directives setting out the product categories requiring CE marking.  Conformity needs to be declared 
for products manufactured outside of the EU if they are to be sold within the EU. (Wellkang Tech 
Consulting, n.d.).  
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and defines a manufacture of a MD as: 
‘the person who is responsible for the design, manufacture, packaging and labelling of 
a device before it is placed on the market under his own name, regardless of whether 
these operations are carried out by that person himself or on his behalf by a third 
party.’ 
Annex IX of the MDD establishes a classification scheme based on an increasing scale of risk of 
patient harm.  A device is subsequently certificated at the classification level that aligns with 
the level of risk the device may introduce.  The MDD defines the classifications as 
Class I - Low risk 
Class IIa - Medium risk 
Class IIb - Medium risk 
Class III - High risk 
The scope of work a manufacturer must undertake and evidence increases with an increase in 
risk classification. 
The MD classification dictates the route to certification and the authority to place the device 
on market.  The UK arrangements for certification is as is depicted in Figure 3 and summarised 
below.  (The same arrangements exist in other EU states, but the EU Representative, 
Regulatory Authority (RA) and Notified Body (NB) responsibilities are discharged by other 
organisations.  UK manufacturers can apply to any NB in the EU and once they have the 
necessary certification their products can be sold anywhere in the EU).  
Her Majesty’s Government is the UK’s representative in the EU and the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), which is an executive agency sponsored by 
the Department of Health and Social Care, is the RA.  The MHRA appoints NBs who are 
responsible for assessing whether a manufacturer and their MD(s) meet the requirements of 
the MDD in cases where that MD is not classified as Class 1.  For Class 1 MDs, the 
manufacturers make a self-declaration of conformity to the MHRA.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - UK Arrangements for MD Certification 
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In May 2017 the Medical Device Regulation (MDR) EU 2017/745 (EU, 2017) came into effect, 
replacing the MDD.  There is a transitional period after which certificates issued under the 
MDD become void and the MD must be removed from market.  The arrangements for 
certification under the MDR remain unchanged. 
The increasing use of standalone software as a medical device, or the use of software as part 
of a medical device or the use of software for health purposes that do not constitute a medical 
device has been recognised in the MDR.  Clause 19 states: 
‘It is necessary to clarify that software in its own right, when specifically intended by 
the manufacturer to be used for one or more of the medical purposes set out in the 
definition of a medical device, qualifies as a medical device, while software for general 
purposes, even when used in a healthcare setting, or software intended for life-style 
and well-being purposes is not a medical device. The qualification of software, either as 
a device or an accessory, is independent of the software's location or the type of 
interconnection between the software and a device.’ 
Further, the MDR provides definition regarding the classification of software through Rule 11: 
‘Software intended to provide information which is used to take decisions with 
diagnosis or therapeutic purposes is classified as Class IIa, except if such decisions have 
an impact that may cause:  
— death or an irreversible deterioration of a person's state of health, in which 
case it is in class III; or  
— a serious deterioration of a person's state of health or a surgical 
intervention, in which case it is classified as class IIb.  
Software intended to monitor physiological processes is classified as class IIa, except if 
it is intended for monitoring of vital physiological parameters, where the nature of 
variations of those parameters is such that it could result in immediate danger to the 
patient, in which case it is classified as class IIb.  
All other software is classified as class I.’ 
In summary, a legislative framework exists to ensure that software is considered in the context 
of its use and its development is regulated and ultimately certificated, taking into 
consideration the degree of impact it may have on patient’s health.   
2.2.2 Health IT 
Software technologies are used for health purposes that fall outside the definition of a MD and 
hence outside the regulation of the MDD/MDR.  Consider the use of general-purpose IT and 
programming environments to provide an enterprise wide Electronic Health Record (EHR) 
System.  An EHR is defined as (Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on Data Standards for 
Patient Safety, 2003):  
Including: 1) longitudinal collection of electronic health information for and about 
persons, where health information is defined as information pertaining to the help of 
an individual or a healthcare provider to an individual; 2) immediate electronic access 
to person and population level information by authorised users; 3) provision of 
knowledge and decision support that enhances the quality, safety and efficiency of 
patient care; and 4) support for efficient processes for health care delivery 
This definition clearly falls outside of the MDD’s “diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, 
treatment” test yet it is easy to recognise that failure of the EHR or unintended use of the EHR 
could impact on the care of the patient and potentially cause harm. 
This distinction between technology that clearly constitutes a MD and is subsequently 
managed through a regulatory framework and that which is not, but still has the potential to 
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cause or contribute to patient harm, was recognised by the international standards community 
in 2008.  ISO/TC 215 Health Informatics (International Organization for Standardization / 
Technical Committee) in collaboration with Technical Committee CEN/TC 251, Health 
informatics (European Committee for Standardization/Technical Committee) worked to 
develop ISO/TS (Technical Specification) 29321:2008 "health Informatics — Application of 
clinical risk management to the manufacture of health software." 
Additionally, the ISO community recognised that the MDD is focused on risk management in 
the context of product development and in support of placing safe products on market; the 
scope does not extend to address the potential risk of subsequent product deployment and 
use.  To address this gap, a complementary specification, ISO/TR 29322:2008 Health 
informatics — Guidance on the management of clinical risk relating to the deployment and use 
of health software" was developed. 
Although this work had significant support, both TRs failed to gain the minimum 75% of 
member body votes required for them to be published as international standards.    
Despite the international decision not to publish, both were adopted in England by the NHS 
Information Standards Board (ISB) and published as CRM standards DSCN 14 (Data Set Change 
Notification) and DSCN 18 in 2009.  Both standards have been revised and updated over time; 
the standard covering manufacture of Health IT is now published as DCB (Data Control Board) 
0129 (NHS Digital, 2018) and the standard covering deployment and use is now published as 
DCB 0160 (NHS Digital, 2018).   Both standards are in scope of the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 under section 250.  
Both standards were updated in June 2018, bringing MDs into scope.  The motivation for this 
change in scope was to address the increasing implementation and use of calculators8 and 
clinical support algorithms in Health IT systems and for the need for CRM to be applied to the 
entire functionality of the Health IT system.  This change in scope does not alter a 
manufacturer’s legal responsibilities under the MDD/MDR and was made in agreement with 
the MHRA. 
The scope and effectivity of this thesis and the supporting research is limited to those 
technologies described as Health IT. 
 Health IT, a Socio-technical Element 
A key discriminating characteristic of Health IT, which can be derived from the discussions at 
sections 2.1 & 2.2, is that it has no direct control over the administration of care to an 
individual patient.  The influence Health IT has on the care of a patient is achieved through 
direct action of Health Care Professionals (HCPs) where a HCP is defined as ‘a person 
associated with either a specialty or a discipline and who is qualified and allowed by regulatory 
bodies to provide a healthcare service to a patient’ (Segan, 1992). The actions a HCP takes or 
the decisions that they make can be influenced by the information the Health IT provides but 
ultimately the final judgement is made by the HCP. 
The concept of Health IT can be thought to be composed of two constituent components; the 
underlying technology of hardware and software and the information and data that is 
managed and communicated by the technology. 
From a CRM point of view, it becomes difficult to consider Health IT as being an independent, 
standalone entity given its different constituent components and their dependency on HCP to 
 
8Increasingly, paper-based calculators are being implemented within Health IT systems to automatically 
provide a score derived from parameters recorded within a patient’s health record.  In some cases the 
algorithms are sufficiently complex or the datasets are so extensive then they constitute medical devices 
as the HCP is unable to independently ascertain the validity of the result.   
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initiate a real-world, patient impacting action.  Failure or malfunction of the technology can 
not directly result in harm to a patient whose care is being managed by the technology.   The 
term socio-technical system has emerged and is used to describe these complex real-world 
scenarios where the combination of different entities combine and have a collective influence 
on the environment in which they exist. Berg (Berg, 1999) defines this concept as “work 
practices to be made up of a number of interrelating networks, which are dependent on one 
another’.  This is a strong definition, as a patient’s care management and administration (in the 
context of Health IT) is achieved through work processes that HCP follow.   
The term Health Informatics (HI) has recently emerged to capture the use of information to 
support healthcare.  There does not appear to be universal definition.  Coiera (Coiera, 2015) 
describes HI as being the ‘study of information and communication processes and systems in 
healthcare” which is strong but does not necessarily take into consideration the contribution 
of technology.  Hersh’s definition (Hersh, 2009) of ‘optimal use of information, often aided by 
the use of technology, to improve individual health’ extends to include the use of technology.  
This is represented pictorially at Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4 - HI as a Socio-technical System 
 
The concept of HI being a socio-technical system established through the integration of people, 
technology and information is the model that is used in this thesis. This aligns with the views of 
Sittig and Singh (Sittig & Singh, 2010) and their development of ‘an eight-dimensional model 
specifically designed to address the sociotechnical challenges involved in design, development, 
implementation, use and evaluation of Health IT within complex adaptive healthcare systems.’ 
The simplified HI model at Fig 4 can be further refined by considering the explicit relationships 
that exist between the three elements.  Regardless of the scale and complexity of the 
HI 
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technology, which may range from a health app9 running on a smart phone through to a 
nationally deployed primary care service10, there is an intrinsic link between the 3 components 
as illustrated in Figure 5.   
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 Figure 5 - Health IT in a Socio-technical Context 
The relationships between components are shown as bi-directional as the influences may 
propagate from the technology, through the information it generates that influences the 
decisions and actions made by the HCP.  Conversely, in response to the physiological and care 
needs of the patient, the HCP may manipulate information that has an impact on the 
technology.  This can be better illustrated through specific examples.  
In primary care11 when assessing the cardiovascular health12 of a patient, the General 
Practitioner (GP) is likely to run the QRISK13 calculator embedded within their desk-top system 
and their subsequent care management decisions will be influenced by the calculated risk 
factor.  An error in the algorithm or its implementation or incorrect coding of risk factors 
within the health record are obvious failures that may result in a skewed or incorrect risk 
 
9 Application programs that offer health-related services for smartphones and tablet PCs.  Accessible to 
patients both at home and on-the-go, health apps are a part of the movement towards mobile health 
services in health care (TechTarget, 2011) 
10 The Electronic Prescription Service enables prescriptions to be created and communicated 
electronically to the patient’s pharmacy of choice, eliminating the need for a paper prescription. (NHS, 
2016) 
11 Primary care services are local points of contact in the NHS and include services such as general 
practice, community pharmacy, dentistry and optometry. (NHS England, n.d.) 
12Those disease that affect the heart and/or blood vessels which include coronary heart disease, stroke, 
arterial disease and aortic disease.  (NHS England, 2018)  
13 The QRISK® algorithm calculates a person's risk of developing a heart attack or stroke over the next 10 
years. It presents the average risk of people with the same risk factors as those entered for that person.  
(ClinRisk, 2018) 
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profile which in turn induces the GP to administer sub-optimal or inappropriate care to the 
patient. 
If, during a primary care prescribing encounter, a patient suffers an allergic reaction to the 
medication prescribed, the GP will code this reaction into the patient’s national Summary Care 
Record (SCR 14) via their Health IT system.  If the patient then presents for care in another care 
setting e.g. at Accident and Emergency (A&E), the HCP can access the SCR, see that the patient 
is allergic to that medication and avoid prescribing it.  A failure to encode the allergy or to 
mistakenly associate it with a different patient’s health record are obvious errors that could 
result in this information not being saved in the patient’s SCR and them potentially being 
administered sub-optimal or inappropriate care. 
 Health Informatics, a Safety Related 
Socio-technical System 
Vincent (Vincent, 2010) describes patient safety as being the ‘avoidance, prevention and 
amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from the process of healthcare.’  The 
adoption and use of Health IT to support healthcare can improve patient safety outcomes but 
can, by introducing a change in the care-process, introduce new problems and associated risk.   
The introduction of electronic prescribing has an obvious advantage over paper-based 
prescribing in eliminating transcription errors that occur when mis-reading a handwritten 
prescription (Bates, et al., 1998).  However, without considered system design, hazards 
associated with alert fatigue and un-safe workarounds and short-cuts can be introduced 
(Kaushal, et al., 2003).  The challenge of integrating technology into care-process is recognised 
by Black (Black, et al., 2011) who identified that the expectation of improved safety following 
the introduction of Health IT is not always realised because Health IT does not always integrate 
into existing care-process. 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) (Institute of Medicine., 2011) establishes that technology is a 
component part of a larger socio-technical system and that ‘safety is an emergent property of 
that larger system’  and that by ‘adopting a sociotechnical perspective acknowledges that 
safety emerges from the interaction among various factors.’  The work goes on to conclude 
that ‘the current state of safety and health IT is not acceptable; specific actions are required to 
improve the safety of health IT’. 
Whilst the its difficult to establish the real state of Health IT (Institute of Medicine., 2011) a 
review of 850 Health IT related patient safety events reported to NHS Digital between 2005 
and 2011 was conducted by (Magrabi, et al., 2015) gives some real-world context.  The review 
concluded that Health IT failures had been hazardous in 68% of the events including 3 events 
which had resulted in death.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Summary Care Records (SCR) are an electronic record of important patient information, created from 
GP medical records and saved on a national system (SPINE). They can be seen and used by authorised 
staff in other areas of the health and care system involved in the patient's direct care.  
https://digital.nhs.uk/services/summary-care-records-scr#using-scr  
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 Clinical Risk Management, General 
Principles 
CRM, in the context of Health IT is defined (NHS Digital, 2018) within the NHS as the systematic 
application of management policies, procedures and practices to the task of analysing, 
evaluating and controlling clinical risk with clinical risk being defined as the combination of the 
severity of harm to a patient and the likelihood of occurrence of that harm.  The inclusion of 
the term clinical is important as it serves to establish the focus of the risk management process 
and to exclude other risk themes such as costs and resources.  This definition of CRM aligns 
with the concept of Safety I which applies management processes and practices to make sure 
that the number of accidents and incident are kept as low as possible or as is as reasonably 
practicable (Hollnagel, 2014). 
The two CRM standards establish both a proactive and reactive approach to CRM.  In a 
proactive approach ‘adjustments are made before something happens’ whilst in a reactive 
approach ‘adjustments are made when unacceptable outcomes have occurred’ (Hollnagel, 
2012).  
2.5.1 Proactive Clinical Risk Management 
The proactive elements of risk management in DCB 0129 & DCB 0160 are depicted in Figure 1 
by the activities of Risk Analysis, Risk Evaluation and Risk Control.  These align with the generic 
4 questions of proactive risk management as illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
RISK ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
RISK 
EVALUATION 
 
 
 
RISK CONTROL 
 
Figure 6 - Proactive Risk Management 
 
The three phases are further elaborated at Figure 7 to describe the activities undertaken 
What could go 
wrong?
How serious 
could it be?
How likely 
could it be?
What should be 
done about it
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Figure 7 - Proactive Risk Management Key Activities 
 
Define system & operation Necessary to define the scope of the implementation and 
operational context in which the management process applies.  
Without doing so the ability to systematically consider how the 
system could fail or e used incorrectly and what the patient harm 
outcomes could be is compromised.  
Identify and describe 
hazard 
 
Use of deviation analysis techniques (SWIFT, FMEA or others) to 
explore what could credibly occur and result in patient harm.  
Definition of hazard. 
Estimate initial clinical risk 
 
Estimate the severity of harm outcome and likelihood of the 
harm outcome by considering what causes need to occur, which 
existing controls need to fail and/or what other conditions need 
to prevail for the hazard to occur.  Risk is the combination of 
severity and likelihood and is derived from a pre-defined 
framework.  Initial risk represents that level of risk that exists 
before any additional controls are introduced. 
Evaluate initial clinical risk 
 
Determine the acceptability of the initial risk against an 
acceptability framework.  If it exceeds the level of acceptability 
further controls need to be considered. 
Identify & implement 
controls 
 
Identify and implement additional controls to reduce risk.  This 
activity also needs to consider whether introduction of controls 
will introduce new hazards or have an impact on existing 
hazards. The controls can either be pre-emptive and eliminate or 
reduce the likelihood of the identified causes resulting in the 
hazard or re-active and reduce the likelihood of the hazard 
propagating into harm.  (in general terms it is difficult to reduce 
the severity of a Health IT related hazard) 
Estimate residual clinical 
risk 
 
Estimate the severity of harm outcome and likelihood of the 
harm outcome after the additional controls have been 
introduced and been demonstrated to be effective. 
 
Define 
system and 
operational 
context
Identify and 
describe 
hazard
Estimate 
initial 
clinical risk
Evaluate 
initial 
clincial risk
If too high, 
identify & 
implement 
controls
Estimate 
residual 
clinical risk
Evaluate 
residual 
clinical risk
If too high, 
conduct 
benefits 
analysis
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Evaluate residual clinical 
risk 
 
Determine the acceptability of the residual risk against an 
acceptability framework.  If it exceeds the level of acceptability 
and no further controls are practical a benefits analysis needs to 
be undertaken.  
Conduct benefits analysis 
 
Analysis conducted to establish whether progressing with the 
system at an undesirable level of risk is outweighed by the 
clinical benefit that the system introduces. 
A model of the implicit proactive CRM process established in DCB 0129 & DCB 0160 has been 
expressed (Habli, et al., 2018) using Goal Structured Notation (GSN)15 and is reproduced at 
Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8 - GSN Representation of CRM Proactive Safety Process 
This model clearly illustrates that the CRM standards take a hazard centric approach to CRM 
where a hazard is defined as a ‘potential source of harm to a patient’.  This approach is not 
unique and is one that is adopted in other safety related industries.  For example, in the 
European rail industry Commission Regulation (EC) No. 352/2009 (EU, 2012)  establishes a 
(revised) common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment and supporting guidance 
establishes that ‘all reasonably foreseeable hazards are identified….’ (Rail Safety and Standards 
Board, 2014) 
 
15 GSN is a graphical notation that can be used to document the relationships between and the elements 
of a safety argument. https://scsc.uk/r141B:1?t=1 
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2.5.2 Reactive Clinical Risk Management 
The concept of reactive CRM is addressed in DCB 0129 & DCB 0160 at Section 7.2, Post-
deployment monitoring.  Requirements establish the need for organisations to establish and 
implement a safety incident management process.  The purpose of this management process 
is to ensure that when things go wrong, they are quickly identified, assessed, resolved and that 
their impact on the safety case for the system is understood.   
A significant influence on the effectiveness of a reactive safety management process is the 
prevailing safety culture of the organisations.  This has been addressed in the civil aerospace 
domain through promotion and introduction of “Just Culture” which is defined (EU, 2014) as ‘a 
culture in which front-line operators or other persons are not punished for actions, omissions or 
decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but in 
which gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated’.   The need to 
establish an open and non-punitive culture within the NHS has been recognised with NHS 
Improvement launching A Just Culture Guide (NHS Improvement, 2018) following 
recommendations made by Professor Sir Norman Williams (Williams, 2018).   
2.5.3 Hazard as a Concept 
The concept and use of a hazard in proactive CRM is fundamentally established in DCB 0129 
and DCB 0160 which define a hazard in a patient care context as a ‘potential source of harm to 
a patient’.  In the engineering domain Leveson (Leveson, 2012) establishes that environmental 
conditions also need to exist with the hazard before an accident can occur.  This engineering 
view can be considered in a healthcare context to establish that the care context needs to be 
considered in combination with the hazard to establish the patient harm outcome. 
This philosophy is illustrated in Figure 9 where different contributions combine to realise 
patient harm 
 
 
Figure 9 - Hazard as a Concept 
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 Hazard Identification, State of Current 
Practice in the Health Domain 
As discussed at Section 2.5, the concept of hazard is firmly embedded in the NHS CRM 
standards.  However, having worked as a Safety Engineer in the NHS for 10 years I hold a view 
that the concept of hazard is not always understood and where it is used the description of the 
hazard rarely articulates or relates to the patient harm outcomes.  Often, the term risk is used 
in place of hazard. 
A similar observation is recorded by Habli (Habli, et al., 2017) where a participant in the 
workshop responded that “the NHS has always worked in ‘risks’: I don't know what a hazard 
is.”  Further, the thematic analysis conducted in that work indicated that there is ‘confusion 
about the terms hazard, risk, harm and quality and where hazards are defined, they are very 
generic and poorly linked to clinical environment.’ 
This observation is evident in the literature: (Battles & Lilford, 2003) make a distinction 
between hazard and risk through definitions that align with those in the CRM safety standards 
but the terms are used interchangeably and together.   Terms such as ‘identify fully the risks 
and hazards’ reinforce the position that they are the same thing rather than a hazard being a 
condition that could result in the harm and risk being a metric to inform the subsequent 
management of that condition.  (Liberati, et al., 2018) also discuss approaches to hazard and 
risk detection. 
The approach to CRM within the health domain has and continues to be largely reactive.  
Review of a NHS hazard identification and risk assessment management procedure 
(Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust, 2014) reveals that, whilst the list is not exhaustive, 
all potential sources of hazard are derived from an organisational response to an external 
factor e.g. following a patient safety conversation.  No consideration is given to proactive 
hazard identification e.g. to support the introduction of a modification to the Health IT; in fact, 
technology or the use of technology was not considered within the scope of the procedure. 
Whilst resources are being developed to foster a systematic approach to managing patient 
safety the viewpoint is largely one of reactive management e.g. NHS Improvement Patient 
Safety Alerts focus on communicating incidents and near misses.  Whilst raising awareness and 
learning from these events is an important, there seems to be very few resources support 
proactive safety management.  
There is a recognition (Sujan, et al., 2015) that Healthcare organisations require support with 
the adoption of proactive and systematic safety management practices that are a key feature 
of safety-critical industries.  Where they have been used proactive techniques such as Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) have been considered to be a very useful procedure for 
proactively evaluating a defined healthcare process (van Tilburg, et al., 2006).  Similar studies 
(Potts, et al., 2014)  recognise that proactive hazard identification is a powerful way to increase 
understanding of risks in a system and implement changes before harm occurs and concludes 
that the collaborative discussion of risks by a healthcare team is powerful and it may be the 
case that raising awareness of risks in the system through these techniques (SWIFT and 
HFMEA) is as important a factor in increasing safety as the identification of hazards. 
Further work by Sujan (Sujan, et al., 2017) identified that participants in the study ‘from the 
health sector suggested that the concepts of risk (in relation to patient safety) and of risk 
management are poorly understood.’ 
From a national perspective the NHS has the benefit of ‘having the longest standing and most 
well developed safety programs’ (Kushniruka, et al., 2013) although a national survey 
undertaken Connecting for Health (former name of NHS Digital) in 2013 (Connecting for 
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Health, 2013) concluded that care organisations within the NHS had little awareness of DSCN 
18 (initial version of what is now designated DCB 0160). 
2.6.1 Hazard Identification Techniques Tools 
The following hazard identification techniques and tools have identified and reviewed from a 
perspective of applicability to HI and their ability to elicit a structured and patient harm centric 
description. 
2.6.1.1 Structured What-IF Technique (SWIFT) 
SWIFT is a well establish technique that is used to support hazard identification (Card, 2013).  
The technique is one of structured brainstorming where guidewords such as “what-if”, “how-
could” are used to explore how deviations in the intended system operation could be induced.  
To be effective, SWIFT should be conducted by a multi-skilled group of people who are able to 
discuss different perspectives and opinions.  As with all deviation analysis techniques an 
accurate and complete description or model of the system is required such that the technique 
can be applied in a systematic and repeatable way.  The main disadvantages (Crawley & Tyler, 
2003) of SWIFT are that the quality of the analysis is significantly influenced by the 
competency of the facilitator and if the workshop is unstructured a lot of time can be spent on 
trivial issues. 
SWIFT is used in healthcare and is advocated by NHS Digital in their national CRM training 
programme. 
Hazard descriptions established using SWIFT are unstructured and will be influenced by the 
experience team; there is an opportunity to compliment SWIFT by supporting the derivation of 
hazards that reflect the scenario explored through the analysis and the patient harm outcome.   
2.6.1.2 Hazard Identification (HAZID) 
This is derived from the technique of HAZOPS (Hazard Operations) which was developed in the 
process industry.  HAZID is a deviation technique that uses guidewords to explore potential 
hazard conditions.  Its conducted from a model of the system and uses guidewords related to 
the characteristic of the system.  It is effective in information systems where guidewords such 
as wrong, late, no can be prefixed to the information in order to determine what the effect on 
the system could be.  The output from HAZID is tabular and does not provide a framework to 
establish the hazard description. 
2.6.1.3 Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is conducted from a functional perspective and considers how failure of the 
implementation technology can result in a system level effect.  It is often extended to include a 
criticality assessment (FMECA) of the effect of the failure (Federal Aviation Authority, 2000).  
FMEA is supported by a structured table and requires a representative model of the system 
and an understanding of the use of the system.  It is very systematic in nature and can be 
undertaken by a single analyst or by a small team.  The methodology can result in a lot of 
output so care is needed in its application. 
FMEA has been adopted and adapted for use in the healthcare domain.  Proactive hazard 
identification in the context of paediatric prescribing (Lago, et al., 2012) focused on failure of 
clinical processes and concluded that  FMEA enabled a prospective analysis of the process of 
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drug delivery to review potential failure modes and their associated causes and to assess which 
risks have the greatest concern, stimulating the most urgent improvement effort in clinical 
practice to prevent errors before they occur. 
FMEA does not provide a framework through which to describe the hazards, but its tabular 
nature means that a structured approach to describe the scenario could be integrated to and 
compliment the technique. 
2.6.1.4 Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) 
FFA is similar to FMEA in that it focuses on failures of the system in order to reveal potential 
hazards.  Unlike FMEA, which is undertaken from a low-level component failure perspective, 
FFA considers failure of the function and as such can be undertaken much earlier in the 
lifecycle; it can be conducted in advance of the implementation being established.  It is 
systematic in nature using a table and failure modes typically of no function, wrong function 
provided when not required to structure the analysis. 
As with FMEA, it does not provide a framework through which to describe the resulting 
hazards. 
 
 Summary 
Health IT is safety related but its contribution to patient harm outcomes cannot be established 
in isolation; they need to be considered as part of socio-technical system.  CRM standards exist 
within the NHS to promote effective safety management from both a proactive and reactive 
perspective.  As is common in other safety related and safety critical industries, the concept of 
hazard is used to establish focus in a proactive safety management process.  However, current 
CRM practice in the health domain seems to be predominately reactive although there is some 
evidence to demonstrate that hazard identification tools and techniques routinely used in 
other industries are being adopted and are yielding positive outcomes.  Although established 
tools exist, they do not enforce a structure in the hazard description that reflects the socio-
technical context in which they occur.   
Conclusions from the literature review re-enforce the research motivation that a mechanism 
needs to be established that aligns with the principles of proactive CRM management and 
enables safety practitioners to consistently and systematically establish hazard descriptions 
that convey meaning and understanding and support subsequent CRM activities.   The 
mechanism needs to be complimentary to existing hazard identification techniques.   
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3 Hazard Survey 
The original evidence base supporting the research motivation and objectives was effectively 
limited to the conclusions of the Habli study (Habli, et al., 2018) and personal observations 
working as a Safety Engineer in the NHS.  The decision to conduct a survey was taken in order 
to establish a wider evidence base, principally from the organisations responsible for meeting 
the requirements of DCB 0160.  It was anticipated that by designing a structured series of 
questions and circulating this to a large audience, a suitably large, qualitative dataset would be 
established that would be amenable to thematic analysis.  This would then be supplemented 
by other research techniques. 
 Purpose 
The principle purpose of designing and conducting a survey was to collate qualitative data that 
would create confidence (or otherwise) that the observations drawn from my own experience 
working as a Safety Engineer and from my literature review are representative in the context 
of health care provision within NHS England. 
 Design 
The approach followed in designing and conducting the survey was derived from that 
described (Stone, 1993) as depicted in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 - D. H. Stone Questionnaire Design 
This process was simplified as shown in Figure 11, taking into consideration the electronic 
nature of the survey and the availability of supporting survey management tools. 
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Figure 11 - Revised Questionnaire Design 
3.2.1 Establish Objectives 
The principal design objectives are as summarised below and further distilled into specific 
design requirements for the survey. 
1. Target Audience - to establish the appropriate target audience i.e. that which is 
responsible for ensuring the requirements of DCB 0160 are addressed within NHS 
England. 
DR1:   Identify target audience of the survey. 
Resolution:  Section 3.2.6 Run 
 
2. Anonymity - to preserve the anonymity of the individual respondents in order not to 
breach their rights under the General Data Protection Regulation (GPDR)16 (Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679, 2016). This needs to be addressed both in terms of the questions asked 
within the survey and in the mechanisation of the survey. 
DR2:   Ensure total anonymity of the respondents to the survey. 
Resolution:  Section 3.2.3 Design the questions 
  Section  3.2.4 Draft & test 
 
 
16Regulation (EU) 2016/679 is European legislation that ensures data protection and privacy for all 
citizens of the EU.  It gives control to individuals on how their personalised data is shared and used. 
Introduce as world-wide regulation on May 25th, 2018, GPDR serves to give more transparency to people 
about what data organisations collect about them and what those organisations use the data for.  It also 
enables people to prevent unnecessary data collection. Additionally, it increases the potential fines 
organisations may face if they are found to be misusing the data they collect.  
 https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr 
 https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3e485e15-11bd-11e6-ba9a-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en 
 
Establish 
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3. Role & Experience - factors that may have an influence on correctness of respondent’s 
answers to knowledge-based questions i.e. experienced clinical respondent could be 
expected to have more knowledge than a junior project manager. 
DR3:  Elicit respondent’s role & experience with respect to clinical risk 
management. 
Resolution:  Section 3.2.3 Design the questions 
  Section  3.2.4 Draft & test 
 
4. Training - a factor that may have an influence on correctness of respondent’s answers 
to knowledge-based questions i.e. respondent who has been trained in risk 
management would be expected to have more knowledge than one that had not. 
DR4:   Elicit respondent’s degree of training in clinical risk management. 
Resolution:  Section 3.2.3 Design the questions 
  Section  3.2.4 Draft & test 
 
5. Knowledge - assimilate respondent’s understanding of key concepts w.r.t hazard 
identification and risk assessment.  No leading questions. 
DR5:  Elicit respondent’s level of knowledge with respect to hazard 
identification and risk assessment. 
Resolution:  Section 3.2.3 Design the questions 
 Section 3.2.4 Draft & test 
 
6. Competence & Confidence - assimilate respondent’s perceived competence and 
confidence in conducting hazard identification and risk assessment activities.  No 
leading questions 
DR6:  Elicit respondent’s level of competence and confidence with respect 
to hazard identification and risk assessment. 
Resolution:  Section 3.2.3 Design the questions 
 Section 3.2.4 Draft & test 
 
7. Brevity - minimise the number of questions and time to complete the survey without 
compromising its effectiveness. 
DR7:   Design short and unambiguous questions 
Resolution:  Section 3.2.3 Design the questions 
  Section  3.2.4 Draft & test 
3.2.2 Structure 
The structure of the survey is as depicted as shown in Figure 12.  It progressively collects 
contextual information before exploring the respondent’s knowledge, competence and 
confidence in undertaking the hazard identification and risk analysis activities.   
There is a need to capture contextual information that may have an influence or impact on the 
knowledge response from a respondent.   For example, a respondent working in a clinical role 
having had training in clinical risk management can reasonably be expected to have stronger 
knowledge and more competence and confidence in performing the activities than that of a 
respondent working in a management role without having had training. 
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Figure 12 - Survey Structure 
3.2.3 Design the Questions 
The following design criteria were observed in designing the specific wording of the survey 
questions: 
• Wherever practical closed questions were used in order to limit the number of 
responses and to reduce the amount of time taken to complete the questionnaire. 
• Where closed questions were not appropriate, open response-option questions were 
used.  These were used in the context of assessing knowledge where options of 
potential correct responses were provided. 
• Open questions were used where it was beneficial for the respondent to provide 
qualifying information to support an answer. 
 
 
•Job title
•Time in role
•Nature of role
•Involvement in lifecycle phases
Non-identifiable data 
that illustrates role and 
experience with respect 
to risk management
•SCCI 0129
•SCCI 0160
•Degree of compliance
•CSO awareness
•Training
Awareness of and 
complinace to safety 
standards
•Test - description
•Understanding of hazard concept
•Test - description
•Test - classification of different elements in a accident sequence
Awareness of and 
complinace to safety 
standards
•Test - description of hazard
•Test - classification of different elements in a accident sequence
Understanding of hazard 
concept
•Test - purpose of
•Knowledge of techniques
•Practice hazard identification
•Competency & confidence
Understanding of  hazard 
identification activities
•Test - purpose of
•Knowledge of techniques
•Practice risk analysis
•Competency & confidence
Understanding of risk 
analysis activities
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The questionnaire design is presented at Appendix A and a specific question is discussed 
below: 
 
Q3.1 Please select the statement which best defines a hazard 
o An event or condition that results in harm (1)  
o Combination of probability of harm occurring and the significance of that harm (2)  
o An event or condition that has the potential to cause harm (3)  
 
This question is designed to provide a knowledge check within the survey.  The concept of 
hazard is central to the CRM process established in DCB 0160 so it follows that CRM 
practitioners must understand its definition.  The question is closed in nature and purposefully 
provides three plausible answers to the question.  Answer 2 is a definition taken from DCB 
0160 that represents risk.  Answers 1 and 3 are very similar with a key discrimination being 
made between a “definite” or “possible” harm outcome.  A competent practitioner should 
recognise that in an accident scenario there may be an opportunity to apply reactive controls 
and prevent or reduce the harm outcome.  
The question is purposefully sequenced in the survey so that it appears after questions that 
qualitatively explores the respondent’s experience, clinical experience, competence and 
confidence in CRM.  High scores in these areas should correlate with a correct answer to this 
question.  
3.2.4 Draft, Test and Evaluate 
The survey was constructed, hosted and communicated using Qualtrics.  The iterative design of 
the survey was tested and revisions made to a point where it could be evaluated 
independently.   
Independent evaluation of the survey was conducted by an experienced NHS Clinical Safety 
Officer and by a Principal Safety Engineer working in the aerospace domain.   Both participants 
were able to access the survey, provide answers to the questions asked and complete it within 
the target time of under 5 minutes. 
Feedback was provided which predominately related to the need to emphasis key elements: 
• ‘highlight the words “competence” & “confidence” in the questions somehow to ensure 
the user is reading the question correctly’ 
and to provide more opportunity to substantiate an answer through the addition of supporting 
narrative: 
• ‘It would be nice to have a bigger text box to be able to view/read back what I had 
written’ 
• ‘A comments box might be useful here to able to explain/quantify answer’ 
Changes were made to the survey to address these comments. 
3.2.5 Run 
The focus of my research is health delivery organisations in both primary and secondary care 
within NHS England.  Consequently, the target audience for this survey was identified as being 
the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs).   
This is justified on the rationale that CCGs are clinically led statutory NHS bodies responsible for 
the planning and commissioning of health care services for their local area (NHS England, 2018) 
Commissioning is defined as the process of assessing needs, planning and prioritising, 
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purchasing and monitoring health services, to get the best health outcomes (NHS England, 
2018) and extends to include consideration of technology in support of care provision.   
The CCGs accountability with respect to Health IT and specifically the risk management 
associated with deployment and use of such is further established in the addendum to the GP 
IT Operating Model (NHS England, 2018)  which, under Clinical Safety Assurance Service  states 
that the CCGs Provides the clinical safety and assurance service required to comply with 
SCCI0160 for all contractors (GPs) providing primary care essential services to a registered 
patient list. (The statutory status of DCB 0160 is discussed at Section 2) 
A mailing list, targeting all 211 CCGs, as published by NHS England at 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/ccg-details/ was created. 
The survey was developed and hosted using Qualtrics and distributed using an anonymous link 
preserving the anonymity of respondents, Figure 13. 
 
 
 
Figure 13 - Preserving Anonymity 
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Further consideration was given to a heightened awareness within organisations with respect 
to preserving the confidentially of personal and sensitive data in light of the recent 
introduction of the GPDR.  A supporting email made it clear that no personal data would be 
asked for or recorded; Figure 14. 
 
Dear Sir / Madam 
 
I’m a Safety Engineer and am currently studying on a Masters by Research programme at the 
University of York.  To support my research, I would like to understand the approach health 
and care organisations take with respect to safety management of technology systems that 
they specify, procure, deploy and maintain to support provision and delivery of care processes. 
 
To this end, I would be grateful if your organisation could complete a short questionnaire, it 
should take no longer than five minutes.  Your Clinical Lead is probably the best person to do 
so. 
 
All responses are totally anonymous; no organisational or personal data is asked for nor 
recorded.  The questionnaire has been approved for use by the University of York's Ethics 
Committee. 
 
Questionnaire Link: 
 
https://york.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_eyBCWVX4qUycr41 
 
Many thanks 
 
Sean 
Figure 14 - Supporting email  
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3.2.6 Analysis 
Table 1 summarises the responses to the survey and clearly illustrates that the response rate 
was very low.   
Table 1 - Survey Response Summary 
Category Number 
Number of organisations contacted 221 
Number of organisations that accessed the link 37 
Number of organisations that answered some questions 7 
Number of organisations that answered all questions 4 
 
This low response rate means that no meaningful statistical analysis or trend analysis can be 
conducted. 
3.2.6.1. Thematic Analysis 
From the onset of the survey design, there had been an intention to conduct thematic analysis 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006) of the returned data-sets in order to establish any qualitative 
relationships and themes between the role characteristics of the respondents and their 
knowledge and test responses.   
Themes of interest and their value in re-enforcing the literature review findings are as 
summarised below in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Influencing Factors and Themes 
 Influencing Factors Anticipated Resulting Theme 
1 Work experience ↑ (Q3.2) & 
Clinical role (Q1.3) & 
Clinical Safety Officer (Q2.6) & 
Knowledge of standards (Q2.1 & Q2.2) & 
Trained in CRM (Q2.6) 
Competency and confidence in Hazard 
Identification & Risk Assessment ↑ (Q4.4, 
Q4.5, Q5.4 & Q5.5) 
2 Organisational compliance with standards 
↑ (Q2.3) 
Competency and confidence in Hazard 
Identification & Risk Assessment ↑ (Q4.4, 
Q4.5, Q5.4 & Q5.5) 
3 Trained in CRM (Q2.6) & 
Correct definition of hazard (Q3.1) 
Ability to identify different elements of an 
accident chain ↑ (Q3.2) 
4 Competency and confidence in Hazard 
Identification & Risk Assessment ↓ (Q4.4, 
4.5, 5.4 & 5.5) 
Lack of awareness to do it (Q4.6 & Q5.6) or 
Lack of skill to do it (Q4.6 & Q5.6) or 
Lack of time to do it (Q4.6 & Q5.6) or 
Another reason (Q4.6 & Q5.6) 
P a g e  37 | 154 
 
 Influencing Factors Anticipated Resulting Theme 
5 Understanding of the purpose of hazard 
identification ↑ (Q4.1) & 
Use of techniques ↑ (Q4.2) 
Competency and confidence in Hazard 
Identification ↑ (Q4.4, Q4.5) 
6 Understanding of the purpose of risk 
analysis (Q5.1) & 
Use of techniques ↑ (Q5.2) 
Competency and confidence in Risk 
Assessment ↑ (Q5.4 & Q5.5) 
7 Knowledge of standards (Q2.1 & Q2.2) Ability to identify different elements of an 
accident chain ↑ (Q3.2) 
Note: ↑ and ↓depict increasing and decreasing strength of the factor or theme.  For example, 
at 2 it is reasonable to conclude that someone who works in an organisation that has a long 
history of having work processes that comply with the CRM standard will have greater 
competency and confidence in the hazard identification and risk assessment that they 
conduct.  
Unfortunately, only a small number of datasets were returned, of which some were 
incomplete, which meant that thematic analysis was not practical.   Limited qualitative 
assessment that could be made is discussed at Section 3.2.6.2 
3.2.6.2. Qualitative Observations 
In the absence of any credible analysis, a small number of qualitative observations have been 
made  
Hazard Identification 
Question 3.1 asked respondents to identify the statement that best describes a hazard from a 
list of 3 alternative definitions: 
• An event or condition that results in harm 
• Combination of probability of harm occurring and the significance of that harm 
• An event or condition that has the potential to cause harm 
As illustrated in Table 3, all 7 respondents identified the correct definition of a hazard as being 
an event or condition that has the potential to cause harm.  Given the subtle difference in 
wording between the 1st definition (of a harm event) and the 3rd definition (of a hazard) and 
that the 2nd definition describes risk (a concept widely used in health organisations) then this 
would suggest that the concept of a hazard is recognised and understood.  However, analysis 
of the responses to Question 3.2 indicates that this understanding is lost when respondents 
were asked to consider the difference between elements in an accident sequence. 
Figure 15 illustrates a simple harm-scenario in which an incorrect coding term within a Health 
IT system potentially results in patients being administered medications which are not 
required. 
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Figure 15 - Harm-scenario 
Respondents were asked to classify each element as a hazard cause, a hazard control, a hazard 
or an accident. 
As illustrated in Table 3 only 2 respondents (4 and 7) correctly identified the associated hazard 
as being Risk calculator gives incorrect rating.  However, inspection of their responses to the 
definition of the other 3 elements would indicate that their understanding is not strong.   
Respondent 7, (care professional) classified all the other 3 elements as also being hazards.  This 
would indicate that they are unable to make a distinction between the different elements 
within a typical accident sequence.  Interestingly, their responses to Q4.3, Q4.4 and Q4.5 
indicate that they undertake hazard identification activities and that they consider that they 
have good competence and some confidence in undertaking these activities. 
Respondent 4, (management) correctly identified Patient administered statins when not 
required as being an accident but incorrectly identified the other 2 elements as also being 
hazards.  Their response to Q4.4 and Q4.5 indicate that have some competence and some 
confidence in undertaking hazard identification activities. 
None of the 7 respondents were able to correctly classify all four elements; in all cases 
respondents misclassified or did not classify at least 2 elements. 
The strongest observation that can be drawn from the responses to Question 3.2 relates to the 
classification of the hazard cause element; Incorrect coding terms in HIT system.  Only 
respondent 2 (management) classified this correctly.  However, they also (incorrectly) 
classified Risk calculator gives incorrect rating and Patient administered statins when not 
required as being hazard causes.  This would indicate a weakness in their associated 
understanding.  All other respondents either failed to make a classification (2 off) or 
(incorrectly) classified it as a hazard.  This observation aligns with conclusions drawn from my 
literature review (Section 2) and analysis of hazard logs (Section 5.1) that there is a tendency 
within health organisations to define hazards at a low level of abstraction, focusing on known 
software bugs and system issues and losing the relationship to potential patient harm events.  
  
P a g e  39 | 154 
 
 
Table 3 - Hazard and Accident Response (Green: correct, Red: incorrect; NR: No response) 
 
Q1.3 
Role 
Q3.1 
Please select the 
statement which 
best defines a 
hazard 
Q3.2 
Risk calculator 
gives incorrect 
rating 
Q3.2 
Dual checking 
of coding 
terms 
Q3.2 
Patient 
administered 
statins when 
not required 
Q3.2 
Incorrect 
coding terms 
in HIT system 
1 Management An event or 
condition that has 
the potential to 
cause harm 
NR NR NR NR 
2 Management An event or 
condition that has 
the potential to 
cause harm 
Hazard Cause Hazard Control Hazard Cause Hazard Cause 
3 Management An event or 
condition that has 
the potential to 
cause harm 
Hazard Cause Hazard Control Accident Hazard 
4 Management An event or 
condition that has 
the potential to 
cause harm 
Hazard Hazard Accident Hazard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Care 
professional 
An event or 
condition that has 
the potential to 
cause harm 
Hazard Cause Hazard Control 
 
 
 
Accident Hazard 
6 Care 
professional 
An event or 
condition that has 
the potential to 
cause harm 
NR NR NR NR 
7 Care 
professional 
An event or 
condition that has 
the potential to 
cause harm 
Hazard Hazard Hazard Hazard 
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Clinical Risk Management Training 
DCB 0160 establishes the role of a Clinical Safety Officer (CSO) in deploying organisations.  
Individuals fulfilling this role need to be registered with a professional body and be suitably 
knowledgeable and experienced in clinical risk management.  They are responsible for 
ensuring that appropriate clinical risk management is undertaken in support of the 
deployment and use of health IT systems within their organisation.    Training is recognised as a 
mechanism for gaining the pre-requisite knowledge; NHS Digital and other, commercial, 
organisations run national training programmes. 
Respondents 5 and 6 (Care professionals) are fulfilling the role of Clinical Safety Officer within 
their organisations and both have undertaken training in the principles of clinical risk 
management (Q2.6). As a consequence, it would be reasonable to expect a strong correlation 
between their responses and the correct classification of the accident sequence elements.  
Whilst Respondent 5 correctly identified the hazard control and accident elements, they 
incorrectly identified the hazard and hazard cause elements. Unfortunately, Respondent 6 did 
not return any answers to Q3.2 (nor to any subsequent questions). 
 
 Summary 
Organising this survey took a significant amount of time.  The ability to run it electronically was 
also complicated by the fact that no single contact list for the national CCG’s seems to exist.  
An email address for each CCG had to be found before a distribution list could be constructed.  
The low response rate to the survey was extremely disappointing.  Potentially the WannaCry 
cyber-attack (NHS England, 2018) that occurred in May 2017 that affected the NHS (and other 
organisations) has resulted in a heightened awareness and a more cautious attitude to 
responding to unsolicited emails and website links.   
Acknowledging that the data-set sample is very small, and that no meaningful thematic 
analysis could be performed, the responses to the survey did not counter my underlying 
perception that health organisations don’t understand the concept of a hazard.   
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4 Hazard Definition Framework & 
Methodology 
 Introduction 
Through the literature review, the analysis of legacy hazards at Section 5.1 and my own 
personal experience it is established that in the domain of HI, practitioners struggle with the 
concept of a hazard and as a consequence hazard definitions can become unstructured and 
don’t necessarily capture the patient harm effect; predominantly they are described in causal 
terms e.g. “loss of N317 connection”.  (More examples illustrating the state of art of current 
practice are presented at Section 5.1). 
This element of the thesis is intended to address research objective 1.3(ii) i.e. the derivation of 
a linguistic framework and a methodology that can be used by CRM HCPs to define hazards 
that are patient centric and reflect the credible scenario from which patient harm may result. 
It is intended that the framework will provide a sequence of linguistic constructs that relate to 
the socio-technical contexts of HI as discussed at Section 2.3 and foster a systematic 
expression of the scenario. 
 
 Care-pathway and Harm-scenario 
Hazard identification cannot be meaningfully undertaken without a definition of the system 
having been established.  This is established in DCB 0129 and DCB 0160 through requirements 
4.2.1 & 4.2.2 and also in other domains. ESSI18 (European Strategic Safety Initiative, 2009) 
establish that “hazard identification techniques require a definition of the System / Operation, 
its environment of operation and its interactions to have been completed prior to undertaking 
the task.” 
In this thesis the following terms are used to support the definition and expression of care and 
patient harm in a HI context. 
• Care-pathway: The organisation of care processes, care management decisions 
and resources need to support the care needs for a defined group of patients.  
• Harm-scenario: a representation of those events that could occur in the care-
pathway (either intentionally or unintentionally) that could credibly result in 
harm to a patient who is being managed on the care-pathway.  
 Hazard Definition 
Considering the concept of a hazard definition, it can be broken down into two properties:  
Hazard Definition = Hazard Name + Hazard Description 
The problem can be simplified if the Hazard Name property is simply thought of as means to 
establish a unique identifier for a specific hazard e.g. “Haz 001” or “patient administered 
wrong medication”.  The format and style of the hazard name are not too important if they are 
used consistently, if there is only one instance of them in safety management system and, if a 
descriptive name is used, it relates to the harm-scenario. 
 
17 N3 (which has recently been replaced by HSCN Health & Social Care Network) was the secure national 
broadband network provided for and used by the NHS 
18 ESSI closed in 2016 and its functions and deliverables transferred to the Safety Risk Management 
system administered by European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). 
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The Hazard Description is the key property.  It needs to describe the prevailing scenario from 
which credible harm could materialise, making a distinction between those events that are 
occurring in the scenario and how they may result in patient harm.   
So, the overarching objective of this research is to devise a linguistic framework that provides 
constructs which will support the expression of meaningful and context relevant Health IT 
related hazards. 
 Harm as a (dis)Benefit 
4.4.1 Business Management Benefits 
Best practice in the discipline of benefits management within the NHS (Baker, 2017) promotes 
the  use of English language constructs to articulate the business objective and describe the 
benefit(s) that will be realised by the recipient of the service.  
Four key linguistic constructs are used which are concatenated to form a meaningful 
expression of the benefit scenario: 
Action: that which is done to initiate a change in the real-world state 
Change: that which is new following the action 
Outcome: the result of the change 
Benefit: the advantage that the recipient gains 
The use of colour to distinguish between the constructs further emphasises the distinction 
between the individual constructs and the combined effect they have in articulating a HI 
related scenario: 
Action, Change, Outcome, Benefit 
Replacing the multiple systems that are currently in use with a single system will mean 
that health care staff will only need to log onto 1 system to find all the information 
they need.  The log-on process will be quicker, releasing enough time for staff to see 
an additional patient during the course of a clinic thereby reducing patient waiting 
times. 
From this description it is easy to understand how an initiating event can propagate through a 
work process and result in an advantage being gained by the recipient of that work process. 
There is an obvious diametric correlation between benefit being an intended positive and 
beneficial advantage and harm being an unintended negative and detrimental disadvantage. It 
follows that harm-scenarios can be constructed and described in the same way.  Table 4 
establishes diametric safety constructs for those constructs used in benefits management: 
Table 4 - Description constructs 
Management Benefit Construct  Harm Construct 
Action 
that which is done to initiate a change in the 
real-world state 
Cause 
An event or action that occurs in the care-
pathway that by itself or in combination with 
other causes can result in the occurrence of 
harm.  A cause may reflect an intentional 
event/action or an unintended event/action. 
Change 
that which is new following the action 
Effect 
The variation or deviation that is introduced 
into the care-pathway from what should be 
conducted to that which is conducted. 
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Outcome 
the result of the change 
Hazard 
The condition that is created in the care-
pathway as a result of the effect that has the 
potential to cause harm 
Benefit 
the advantage that the recipient gains 
Harm 
Realisation of harm to the patient who is on 
the care-pathway. 
 
A framework can be developed using this sequence of harm constructs to build hazard 
descriptions: 
 
Figure 16 - Hazard description framework 
 
4.4.2 Socio-technical Integration of the Framework 
The framework can be transposed onto the HI socio-technical model developed at Section 2.3 
to illustrate the context in which the identified constructs exist. This is shown at Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 - Framework in HI Context 
  
P a g e  44 | 154 
 
The rationale for the transposition is as follows: 
 
Harm: By definition of the prevailing CRM standards (DCB 0129& DCB 0160) 
harm occurs to patients.  Consequently, harm must be expressed in the 
context of the patient who is being managed on the care-pathway. 
 
Hazard:  From the definition of different health technologies discussed at Section 
2.2.1 & 2.2.1 it can be established that Health IT has no direct 
“integration” with the patient; any “diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, 
treatment or alleviation” is undertaken by the HCP (otherwise it would be 
classified as a MD). By definition of the prevailing CRM standards (DCB 
0129& DCB 0160) a hazard “is an event or condition that that has the 
potential to cause harm”.  It therefor follows that incorrect, inappropriate 
or unintended actions of the HCP can represent hazards. 
 
Effect: Care management and delivery is achieved through adherence to a care-
pathway which in turn is supported by the provision (and collection) of 
information.  Actions undertaken and decisions made are influenced by 
the information; incorrect, misleading or confusing information can have 
a disturbance effect in the care-pathway causing actions to be taken or 
decisions to be made that represent a deviation from that which should 
be conducted. An assessment can be made as to whether this new and 
unexpected change in information in the care-pathway can result in a 
hazard being created. 
 
Cause: Information is generated by and consumed by technology. Technology 
failures or maloperation can cause a loss of, corruption or skewing of the 
information that is used to support the care-pathway. 
Similarly, information is influenced by the actions of the HCP and they 
may act as a cause, initiating or propagating a change in the information. 
It should be noted that a cause may not always be a failure; for example, 
a HCP may perform the correct action in the context of unknowingly being 
presented with mis-information and continue to propagate the 
disturbance effect within the care-pathway.  This is discussed further at 
Section 4.4.3. 
4.4.3 Humans as a Cause 
During the second phase of evaluation of this framework (Section 5.2, CSO review) a 
respondent raised a concern that by identifying hazards at the point of interaction between 
the HCP and the patient a view could be induced that the HCP is the hazard or is the source of 
the hazard.  Through the subsequent discussions it was established that the original model (as 
presented in Appendix C) required further elaboration to include the contribution a human can 
make acting as a cause in the harm scenario. 
In following a Health IT enabled care-pathway, it is probable that the HCP will create data and 
change information through the course of their actions e.g. update a patient’s records to 
reflect the conclusion of their triage.   
As with other causes in the care-pathway the action of the HCP may represent a failure e.g. an 
erroneous action or a correct action which is taken unwittingly e.g. without knowledge of a 
previous change in the care-pathway. 
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Human failures can be categorised into different types as summarised by (HSE, 2012) and 
illustrated at Table 5. 
Table 5 - Human Failure Types 
Human Error 
 
Skill Based Error Slip: not doing what is 
meant to be done e.g. 
recording weight in wrong 
part of the chart. 
Lapse: Forgetting to do 
something e.g. missing out a 
step in a work procedure. 
Mistake Rule-based: following the 
wrong procedure for the 
work to be done 
Knowledge-based: not 
having sufficient knowledge 
or experience to undertake 
the work to be done 
Violations  Deliberately doing the 
wrong thing 
 
The scenario at Figure 18 illustrates how a HCP can act as a cause in a care-pathway, 
propagating an effect in the care pathway by doing the “right thing” unwittingly not knowing 
that the deviation effect has occurred. 
Hazard
Harm
Patient
Consultant
1 Creates 
intended 
prescription
Prescribing System 
2 Corrupts 
intended 
prescription
Pharmacist
3 Prepares 
unintended 
prescription
Nurse
4 Checks 
unintended 
prescription
Nurse
5 Administers 
unintended 
prescription
Un-intended 
prescription
Un-intended 
prescription
Intended 
prescription
Un-intended 
prescription
Un-intended 
medication
6 Experiences 
side effects
 
Figure 18 - Humans as causes 
Key 
Green box: correct action being undertaken 
Red box: incorrect action being undertaken 
Coloured icon: framework construct type 
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Process step 
1 Consultant creates intended prescription that addresses the care needs of patient and 
commits the prescription to the Health IT system. 
2 There is a drug mapping error in the Health IT system which results in a different un-
intended prescription being established.  A disturbance effect has been created in the 
care-pathway.  
3 Pharmacist receives un-intended prescription and with no knowledge of original 
prescribing intent follows correct work process and prepares the medication in 
accordance with un-intended prescription.  Disturbance effect is propagated through 
the care-pathway. 
4 1st Nurse, with no knowledge of original prescribing intent, follows correct work 
process and checks medications against un-intended prescription. Disruption effect is 
propagated through the care-pathway. 
5 2nd Nurse, with no knowledge of original prescribing intent, follows correct work 
process and checks medications against un-intended prescription.  A hazard is 
introduced into the care-pathway at this point of administration of medication. 
6 Harm occurs because patient suffers side-effects on taking unintended medication. 
 
4.4.4 The Framework as an Ontology 
By definition (Gruber, 2009) an ontology in the context of computer and information sciences 
is “a set of representational primitives with which to model a domain of knowledge or 
discourse.”  A simple ontology for the framework is presented at Figure 19 which further 
illustrates the relationships between the linguistic constructs and the socio-technical context in 
which they are relevant.   
High level cause primitives are further detailed to provide thematic cues to support 
consideration of the harm-scenario.  However, it must be remembered that the purpose of the 
framework is not to support hazard analysis and a balance needs to be drawn between 
describing the harm-scenario and analysing the harm-scenario.  One cause primitive reflects 
the guidance written by the Safety Critical System Club19 (SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working 
Group, 2019) which considers how data should be managed in the context of safety related 
systems.  A second cause primitive considers the SEIPS 2 Framework20  (Holden, et al., 2013) 
which will assist in establishing human factor considerations that can influence the actions of 
HCP as causes in the harm-scenario. 
In recognising 4 key linguistic concepts, the sequential relationship between them and the 
socio-technical context in which there are relevant it is concluded that meaningful hazard 
description can be developed to elaborate harm-scenarios in the HI domain.  
 
 
19Data Safety Guidance (SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working Group, 2019) reflects best practice as to 
how data should be managed in a safety-related context. 
20 SEIPS2 (Holden, et al., 2013) establishes a human factors framework through which healthcare 
outcomes can be improved by considering and improving the work done by people in the socio-technical 
healthcare system. 
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Figure 19 - Framework as an Ontology 
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 Applying the Framework 
The ontology at Figure 19 has been applied to the Q-RISK scenario described at Section 2.3 and 
is shown below at Figure 20 
 
 
Figure 20 - Q-RISK Ontology 
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The hazard description can then be established by observing the sequence of constructs 
 
Cause Erroneous risk factor set 
Or 
Erroneous algorithmic implementation 
Effect Low risk score generated for person at risk 
Hazard Cardiac health management not provided  
Harm Near term cardiac arrest 
 
Erroneous risk factor set used or error in algorithm implementation results in a low risk score 
for patient at risk.  Cardiac care management is not administered, and the patient suffers near 
term cardiac arrest.  
Here the cause description has been generalised to capture the 3 specific causes that can 
result in the risk factor set not being representative.  Similarly, the effect considers those 
causes that would mask the fact that the patient has a pre-disposition to cardio-vascular 
disease. 
Alternatively, the framework can be superimposed on a model of the care-pathway.  In Figure 
21 the SCR scenario described at Section 2.3 has been modelled as a care-pathway in SMART21 
Blue boxes represent activities undertaken and yellow diamonds represent decisions made.  
Human roles e.g. “Nurse” or system functions e.g. “Record Allergy Status” can be mapped to 
the actives or decisions. 
The method for applying the framework to a model is to identify within the care-pathway the 
point of interaction with the patient as it is at this interface that the potential for harm occurs 
i.e. where the hazard exists.  It is then a process of stepping back through the care-pathway 
considering if the activity or decision could represent a change or disturbance i.e. an effect.  
Having identified an effect, the process of stepping back continues to identify related effects or 
causes.  
 
21 SMART: Safety Modelling, Analysis and Reporting Tool is a software modelling environment that 
enables users to conduct safety analysis and generate safety case reports that adhere to the 
requirements of DCB 0129 & DCB 0160.  It has been developed in collaboration with The University of 
York and NHS Digital. 
https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/safedh/SMART.html 
Cause Effect Hazard Harm
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Figure 21 - Framework on a Model 
The rationale applied in this scenario for categorising particular elements in the scenario is as 
summarised in Table 6: 
Table 6 - SCR Analysis 
Model component Framework construct & rationale 
7 Prescribed medicine administered Hazard 
Point of care delivery so exists in the people 
context. 
Activity is discharged by a Nurse. 
Potential for harm to occur if the patient is 
allergic to the medication. 
6 Selected medication prescribed Effect 
Not a hazard as activity does not occur at 
point of care delivery although the activity 
occurs in the people context i.e. conducted by 
a prescriber. 
Represents a deviation from the intended 
care-pathway which safeguards against 
prescribing of drugs to which the patient is 
allergic.  Although the prescribing activity is 
conducted in accordance with the prescriber’s 
knowledge, the (mis)information is inducing 
an unwanted effect in the care-pathway. 
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Model component Framework construct & rationale 
5 Allergy on patient’s SCR? Effect 
Misinformation at this decision point i.e. an 
allergy to the medication not being recorded 
on the patient’s SCR.  
Not categorised as a Cause as it reflects the 
effect of (failure) causes i.e. misinformation in 
the patient’s record. 
 
It has not been able to identify specific causes in this model of the care-pathway partly due to 
its purposeful simplification and the fact that viewpoint of the model is from one of care 
management and associated work processes. 
To identify possible causes to the effect of incorrect allergy information in the patient’s SCR, its 
necessary to look at the underlying data model to understand what system functions support 
this decision point.  An extract from the system definition within SMART shows that Record 
Allergy Status is mapped to this decision. 
 
Name Description 
Record Allergy Status 
Patient’s drug allergy status written to 
patient’s SCR.  
Care Process Care Process Step 
Used in Care Process: EMERGENCY 
PRESCRIBIING 
Used in Care ProcessStep: ( (Decision) 5 
Allergy on patient's SCR? ). 
 
A hazard description can be developed: 
 
Cause Patient’s allergy status not written to SCR 
Effect Patient’s allergy status masked at point of medicine prescription 
Hazard Patient administered medicine to which they are allergic  
Harm Toxic shock 
 
Patient’s allergy status is not recorded in SCR so is masked at point of prescription. Patient is 
administered medicine to which they are allergic, and subsequently suffers a toxic shock.  
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 Informing Risk Analysis 
As previously established, the focus of this research is not aimed at hazard analysis.  However, 
during the workshop evaluation (Section 5.4) it was realised that by applying rigour in the 
derivation and construction of a patient centric, hazard description there is an opportunity to 
inform and initiate subsequent hazard analysis activities. 
The bow-tie methodology (de Ruijter & Guldenmund, 2016) so described as it represents a 
man’s bowtie, uses simple graphical notation to represent the relationship between hazards, 
their causes, consequences and controls. It is widely used in safety related industries and is 
promoted by NHS Digital in their CRM training.  The methodology is embedded within SMART.   
The hazard description established by applying the research methodology can be readily 
transposed to establish the basis of a bow-tie model.  This is illustrated in Figure 22 in the 
context of the SCR harm-scenario using the bow-tie editor in SMART. 
 
  
Figure 22 - Supporting Hazard Analysis Using SMART 
(Note, the coloured boxes have been superimposed to reflect the linguistic constructs.) 
Clearly, this initial model does not represent the full analysis but adds value to the process by 
establishing an initial model that should support focused development. 
 
 SMART Requirements 
Table 7 details requirements that have been derived from Section 4.6 for consideration in the 
on-going development of SMART: 
 
Table 7 - Derived SMART Functional Requirements  
Req Description Rationale 
S1 When a “Role” is linked to an 
Activity/Decision in a Care Process the 
Activity/Decision shall become green. 
Hazards exist at the point of interaction with the 
patient.  By automatically annotating those 
points in the Care Process model the user of 
SMART is prompted towards activities/decisions 
that could be hazardous. 
S2 The user of SMART shall have the ability 
to revert green Activity/Decision steps 
back to their default colour. 
Not all points of interaction with the patient will 
be hazardous. 
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Req Description Rationale 
S3 When a “Function” is linked to an 
Activity/Decision in a Care Process the 
Activity/Decision shall become blue. 
Functions of the Health IT have the potential to 
be causes of a hazard.  By automatically 
annotating those points in the Care Process 
model the user of SMART is prompted to 
consider whether those functions could be 
causes to identified hazardous. 
S4 The user of SMART shall have the ability 
to revert blue Activity/Decision steps 
back to their default colour. 
Not all functions of the Health IT will be causes 
of a hazard. 
S5 The user of SMART shall have the ability 
to manually change the colour of an 
Activity/Decision to blue, red, green or 
purple to reflect a particular linguistic 
construct. 
The user needs the ability to overlay the 
framework independently. 
S6 The user of SMART shall have the ability 
to revert a coloured Activity/Decision 
step back to its default colour. 
The user needs the ability to undo any changes. 
S7 Where elements of the framework have 
been annotated in the Care Process 
SMART shall automatically generate the 
hazard description. 
This will save the user of SAMRT time and will 
ensure traceability between the Care Process 
model and the hazard description. 
S8 Where elements of the framework have 
been annotated in the Care Process 
SMART shall automatically use these to 
establish the basis of the bow-tie model. 
This will save the user of SAMRT time and will 
ensure traceability between the Care Process 
model, the hazard description and the hazard 
analysis. 
 
 
 Summary 
The framework described here is derived from the benefits management domain.  The use of 
four simple constructs, their sequential relationship and an understanding of the context in 
which they exist in a socio-technical system has the potential to introduce a systematic and 
consistent approach to hazard description in the HI domain.  The framework can be applied by 
using the ontology developed herein or by transposing the framework constructs onto a model 
of the care-pathway.  There is additional benefit in that the structured description can be used 
to establish an initial bow-tie representation of the harm-scenario and so direct subsequent 
risk analysis activities.  
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5 Hazard Description Evaluation 
The purpose of the evaluation is to gain confidence that the research conducted and the 
hazard description methodology that has been developed addresses the 2 original research 
objectives which in turn have been further refined into 4 subobjectives as summarised in Table 
8: 
 Table 8 - Research Objectives 
Research Objective Sub-objective Principal Evaluation Method 
(see Figure 23) 
(1.3i) to understand the 
challenges health 
organisations encounter 
in trying to comply with 
Requirement 4.3 of DCB 
0160 i.e. the definition of 
HI related hazards.   
 
 
1. To affirm the research 
observation that the concept 
of hazard within the context 
of HI is one that is not well 
understood and often 
described without reference 
to patient harm outcomes.  
1 Application to legacy 
hazards will identify (or 
otherwise) a lack of patient 
harm outcome in existing 
hazard descriptions. 
2 Targeted CSO review and 
evaluation will establish (or 
otherwise) that practitioners 
of CRM within the NHS share 
the same view. 
3 Conference presentation 
and evaluation will provide a 
consensus of opinion within 
the target audience that the 
research observation is 
accurate (or otherwise).  
(1.3ii) to devise a 
methodology to assist 
organisations in 
addressing Requirement 
4.3 of DCB 0160 which 
will support the 
meaningful definition of 
HI-related hazards.   
 
2. To affirm that the 
methodology ensures that 
hazards are expressed in the 
context of care delivery and 
management and that they 
remained focused to the 
point of impact on the 
health of a patient. 
1 Application to legacy 
hazards will enable the 
hazard descriptions to be re-
expressed and qualitatively 
evaluated by an experienced 
CSO 
4 Application in a pilot study 
will enable real-world hazard 
scenarios to be described by 
and qualitatively evaluated 
by CRM practitioners.   
(1.3ii) to devise a 
methodology to assist 
organisations in 
addressing Requirement 
4.3 of DCB 0160 which 
will support the 
meaningful definition of 
HI-related hazards.   
 
3. To affirm that the 
methodology can be applied 
in practice. 
3 Conference presentation 
and evaluation will expose 
the methodology to a wider 
audience and provide a large-
scale qualitative evaluation 
by CRM practitioners in the 
context of a specific case 
study. 
4 Application in a pilot study 
will demonstrate (or 
otherwise) that the 
methodology can be applied 
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in an existing CRM system.  
5 Training course module and 
evaluation will expose the 
methodology to a wider 
audience and demonstrate 
(or otherwise) that the 
methodology can be applied 
in the context of a specific 
case study. 
(1.3ii) to devise a 
methodology to assist 
organisations in 
addressing Requirement 
4.3 of DCB 0160 which 
will support the 
meaningful definition of 
HI-related hazards.   
 
4. To affirm that the 
methodology supports 
communication and 
understanding of the harm 
scenario. 
2 Targeted CSO review and 
evaluation will provide 
expert opinion to 
substantiate the claim (or 
otherwise).  
3 Conference presentation 
and evaluation will provide a 
wider sample set of opinion 
to substantiate the claim (or 
otherwise). 
4 Application in a pilot study 
will provide opportunity to 
observe the characteristics of 
communication and 
understanding amongst 
different stakeholders.  
5 Training course module and 
evaluation will provide a 
wider sample set of opinion 
to substantiate the claim (or 
otherwise). 
 
Evaluation of the framework and the method of application has been evaluated through five 
separate and different approaches with the feedback being appraised and, if necessary, the 
framework revised before conducting the subsequent evaluation activity.   
The following nomenclature is used to uniquely identify the specific actions raised through the 
analysis of the evaluation feedback: 
 Action Na.b.c 
 Where 
  N = E; address in subsequent evaluation or 
  N = T; address in toolkit 
  a.b. = 2nd subsection number e.g. 5.2 
  c = incremental integer starting from 1. 
So Action T5.3.2 means 2nd toolkit requirement associated with “Workshop 
presentation and evaluation” 
The evaluation methodology is depicted in Figure 23 and each activity is documented in 
subsequent sub-sections. 
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Figure 23 - Research Evaluation Strategy 
 Application of Framework to Legacy 
Hazards 
5.1.1 Hazard Selection 
The hazard descriptions were selected using the following criteria to ensure diversity in the 
sample set and to avoid the introduction of any bias: 
1. Care setting: examples from different care settings were selected representing 
primary care and secondary care settings to represent different HI environments. 
2. Care services: example from different care services were selected e.g. prescribing 
and new birth registration to yield different harm scenarios. 
3. Standards: examples from both manufacturers and care delivery organisations 
were selected to represent different lifecycle phases. 
4. Date: examples were selected over a date range of 8 years from current date to 
ensure no maturity bias.   
 
A total of 54 hazard descriptions fulfilling the above criteria were selected for review from 
hazard logs submitted to NHS Digital. 
  
1 Application to legacy hazards
Applicationof the framework to the legacy hazards 
presented at Section 5.1 and clinical review with a CSO
2 Targetted CSO review and evaluation
Research aims and  framework summarised in short paper 
and circulated to small cohort of targeted CSO for appraisal 
& feedback
3 Conference presentation and evaluation
Presentation of the framework and evaluation by a large 
cohort of random CSOs at a conference workshop.
4 Application in pilot study
Presentation, application and evaluation of the framework 
with a clinical safety team in support of new system 
functionality.
5 Training course module & evaluation
Incorporation of framework as a learning module in a 
national training course with practical application 
workshop and evaluation
P a g e  57 | 154 
 
5.1.2 Hazard Review and Appraisal 
Each hazard description was reviewed in isolation from its supporting Clinical Safety Case 
Report (CSCR).  This was done to avoid any subsequent knowledge that would be gained from 
reading the CSCR influencing the appraisal of the hazard description.  It could be argued that 
this is a flawed approach as in practice the hazard description would constitute part of the 
CSCR and would be appraised in that context.  Whilst this is true, the hazard definition should 
be established early in the lifecycle, in advance of the creation of a CSCR, forming a constituent 
element of the Hazard Log (HL).  Given the purpose of the HL is to support and communicate 
the ongoing management of hazards through a project lifecycle it follows that the hazard 
definition must be expressed to achieve this. 
The Hazard Description of each hazard was reviewed to assess if it articulated any of the four 
linguistic constructs; cause, effect, hazard or harm. 
Of 54 hazards: 
 20 hazard descriptions related to causes 
 27 hazard descriptions related to effects 
 2 hazard descriptions related to cause and effect 
 0 hazard descriptions related to a hazard 
 0 hazard descriptions related to harm 
The scope of the review was expanded to take into consideration the ‘Hazard Name’ and 
‘Potential Clinical Impact’ elements of the HL (where populated) to establish if collectively the 
three elements provided a more representative hazard description. 
The findings of this analysis are provided at Appendix B. 
Whilst the number constructs increased it was largely related to the ‘Potential Clinical Impact’ 
element being populated as an effect concept not as a hazard concept as would be expected.  
The most significant observation is that patient harm was only expressed in 2 of the 54 
hazards.  
5.1.3 Hazard Re-expression Using Framework 
All 54 hazards were re-expressed using the ontology to identify and describe the 4 sequential 
constructs.  As stated above, with the exception of 2 hazards, the legacy descriptions did not 
describe the patient harm outcomes.  As a consequence, without this context, it was difficult 
to articulate the harm construct.  To address this, the supporting safety cases were examined 
to establish if they provided the harm context.  A random dip check illustrated that they did 
not so a decision was made to simply record a generic harm consequence.  In practice, when 
analysing the care-pathway, application of the framework in the care context will ensure the 
harm consequence is captured. 
The re-expressed hazard descriptions are at Appendix B. 
5.1.4 CSO Review and Appraisal 
This was conducted in two phases. 
In phase 1 the CSO was asked to review the original legacy hazard descriptions and articulate 
their thoughts.  To ensure their review remained aligned with the objectives of this thesis the 
CSO was briefed to consider if they could understand the care scenario and whether the 
patient harm outcome was evident.  The CSO was not promoted at any time nor where they 
asked any questions.  At the end of this phase the CSO was asked to summarise their 
conclusions. 
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In phase 2 the objectives of the research and the derivation and application of the framework 
was explained to the CSO.  The CSO was then asked to appraise the hazard descriptions 
established having applied the linguistic framework, with a focus as per phase 1.  
5.1.4.1 CSO Review – Phase 1 
The comments made by the CSO during the review of the legacy hazard descriptions have been 
grouped into themes which are summarised in Table 9 
Table 9 - Legacy hazards themes 
Hazard descriptions are confusing and clinical conclusions cannot be made. 
Causes to hazards are expressed as hazards with no reference to patient harm. 
Difficult to derive an understanding of the scenario although in some cases 
patient harm is discussed. 
Hazard descriptions are complex and include multiple causes and associated 
controls.  Analysis is being documented in the description. 
Hazard descriptions do not capture patient harm. 
No correlation between hazard name and the hazard description. 
Multiple care scenarios expressed in the description. 
Hazard descriptions are vague and general. 
Hazard descriptions do not capture care/clinical context. 
 
The concluding observations made by the CSO following review of the legacy hazards are 
summarised in Table 10 along with the feedback provided to the CSO. 
Table 10 - Legacy hazards observations 
CSO Observation Author Comment 
“We need to change current practice!” Aligns with the findings of this research and 
my own personal observations. 
It is the intention of this research that the 
framework developed and the methods for 
its application will be embedded into NHS 
resources (CRM training, best practice guide, 
Standards implementation guidance) in 
order to promote and establish a robust 
approach to hazard definition. 
“There isn’t a consistent approach to 
describing hazards” 
Whilst an attempt has been made within the 
framework of the two CRM standards to 
provide a mechanism to drive consistency 
i.e. by establishing specific entries in the HL 
template, this review evidence establishes 
that there is a great deal of variance in how 
these particular entries are populated and 
that they are proving to be rather ineffective 
in communicating the harm scenario.  
Adoption of the framework will address this 
as it establishes a sequence of inter-related 
constructs that when concatenated 
describes the harm scenario from initiating 
event to harm outcome. 
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CSO Observation Author Comment 
“There is not a strong correlation with the 
patient” 
The patient is often overlooked and the 
emphasis and focus of the description often 
centres around the causes.  The reasons for 
this have not been investigated within the 
scope of this research but it’s not 
unreasonable to assume that the absence of 
any existing methodology to support the 
expression of a harm scenario is a 
contributory factor.  
“No clinical context provided but can it be 
given?” 
The answer must be a “yes” otherwise 
confidence in the effectiveness and 
relevance of subsequent clinical risk analysis 
and evaluation activities will be low.  Hazard 
identification is the starting point of the CRM 
process so if the clinical context cannot be 
communicated it will be difficult to 
understand or accept any subsequent risk 
assessment.  A constituent element of risk is 
the severity of the consequence; without 
understanding and communicating the 
clinical context then it becomes difficult to 
make a meaningful risk assessment. 
The “effect” construct addresses this point 
as it serves to capture and analyse the 
disturbance that may occur in the care 
pathway due to the occurrence of the 
“cause”.  From this knowledge point an 
assessment can be made as to whether a 
“harm” outcome is credible through the 
realisation of a “hazard”.   
5.1.4.2 CSO Review – Phase 2 
No specific themes emerged from the review of the revised hazard descriptions, but the 
concluding observations are summarised in Table 11 along with the feedback provided to the 
CSO.  Note, these are presented in the order in which they were raised and reflect a growing 
understanding and endorsement of the framework as the number of hazard descriptions 
reviewed increased. 
Table 11 - Revised hazards observations 
CSO Observation Author Comment 
“Do the revised description offer any 
benefit?”  
This was an initial thought raised after reviewing the 
first description.  However, after reviewing a further 
2 descriptions, by their own admission, the penny 
dropped and the CSO subsequently raised positive 
observations as summarised below. 
There had been a limited amount of time to explain 
the methodology in advance of the review and this 
initial comment probably reflects that.   
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CSO Observation Author Comment 
“Different to what we are 
accustomed to; there is a lot of text 
in the box.” 
This was expressed in the context of the CSO 
fulfilling their role, reviewing the work of others in 
support of approving clinical deployment of Health 
IT.   
Whilst the description may appear to be lengthy it is 
no longer expressed over three HL entries.  In many 
cases the word count is actually less.  Further, the 
description is structured and provides a sequenced 
narrative of the patient’s journey through the care 
pathway.  
“Including causes in the description 
could be problematic.” 
The purpose of the framework is to set the scene; it 
is not intended to constitute the risk analysis.  To 
this end, the description should be expressed at a 
high level of abstraction and causes generalised 
wherever practical.  If the description is starting to 
include a set of specific causes this should be taken 
as a cue to re-focus.  
“The effect concept is useful as it 
prompts you to think of a hazard in 
the context of the care that is being 
administered to the patient.” 
Exactly, the focus of CRM effort has to be in the 
context of credible harm that could occur to the 
patient where their care is being supported by 
Health IT.  
“Easier to express the real-world 
scenario from which hazards can be 
derived.” 
Exactly, there is a need to be able to describe 
credible scenarios in the care pathway from which 
the patient may suffer harm.  If this cannot be 
articulated, then it is not feasible to conduct 
meaningful risk analysis or make informed and 
reasoned safety management decisions. 
“Sequence of knock-on events easier 
to understand.” 
Exactly, by structuring the description to reflect the 
relationship between different events in the harm 
scenario aids communication and understanding of 
the patient harm concern that credibly exists in the 
care pathway. 
“Easier to read and understand and 
even if you are not an expert you are 
in a better position to comprehend 
or challenge.” 
In essence, this is the objective of the research. 
 
5.1.5 Summary 
This phase of evaluation supports substantiation of objective 1, particularly the research 
observation that hazards are often described without reference to patient outcomes.  This was 
observed through my own review and through that of the independent CSO.   
It also supports substantiation of objective 2 which is to affirm that the framework establishes 
that hazard descriptions are focused on the impact of care delivery in the context of patient 
harm outcomes.  There was recognition by the CSO that application of the framework results 
in hazard descriptions that are patient harm centric and convey an understanding of the chain 
of events that can lead to harm.  
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 Targeted CSO review 
5.2.1 Cohort Selection 
The cohort was specifically chosen from a network of CSOs known to me (through my 
engagements working in my role of Senior Safety Engineer at NHS Digital) to ensure a high 
degree of diversity in the sample set as is detailed in Table 12 below: 
 
Table 12 - Clinical Safety Officer Cohort 
CSO Role 
Identifier 
Operational Context 
1.  CSOs working for NHS Digital, both in an independent assurance role and 
in a programme CSO role.  Experienced in evaluating the clinical risk 
management activities of Health IT system manufactures providing 
systems into primary and acute care within the NHS.  Experienced in 
conducting clinical risk management in the context of a national authority 
developing services and systems for widespread use in the NHS. 
2.  CSOs working for Health IT system manufacturers, providing technology 
into different care settings within the NHS.  Experienced in conducting 
clinical risk management to address the requirements of DCB 0129, 
national and customer requirements in support of the development and 
sale of commercial products.  
3.  CSO working for a health organisation that develops its own Health IT 
systems. Experienced in conducting clinical risk management to address 
the requirements of both DCB 0129 and DCB 0160 in support of the 
development, deployment and use of bespoke Health IT systems to 
address local requirements. 
4.  CSOs working for clinical and mental health organisations within the NHS.  
Experienced in conducting clinical risk management to address the 
requirements of DCB 0160 in support of the procurement and 
deployment of Health IT systems procured from commercial 
organisations into specific care settings. 
5.  CSO working as an independent consultant providing clinical risk 
management services to Health IT manufacturers and the NHS. 
Experienced in conducting clinical risk management in support and 
deployment of different Health IT systems across a broad section of care 
settings. 
 
Further, the cohort was selected based on the competence and experience of the CSOs.  
Through my previous interactions with the CSOs I am of the opinion that they all have a strong 
understanding of clinical risk management processes and have extensive experience of 
implementing effective clinical risk management within their organisations.  Clearly, these are 
important characteristics and are necessary to establish a knowledge base from which 
objective and critical appraisal could be made.  A deliberate decision was made not to include 
new in role or less experienced CSOs within the scope of the survey.  I was concerned that 
feedback or questions relating to their lack of knowledge could be raised and skew their 
appraisal of the methodology.  For example, if they only had limited experience of identifying 
and describing hazards it could be difficult for them to offer opinion as to whether the 
framework helps or hinders (Question 2 Table 13).    
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There is an inherent risk in the above strategy: 
• Competencies of the respondents could mask shortcomings in the methodology.  For 
example, drawing on their previous experience and knowledge they understand the 
transition between a “cause” and an “effect”; this may not be obvious to a less 
experienced CSO.  
The potential bias introduced by purposefully selecting experienced CSOs is considered to be 
mitigated through the 3rd evaluation method; workshop presentation and feedback.  Whilst 
the delegates attending the workshop were targeted on the basis of them actively working in 
the HI domain, they represented a broad cross section of roles with a varying degree of and 
experience.  This was established by reviewing the delegates role details submitted when 
registering for the workshop.  
5.2.2 Cohort Briefing 
The research challenge and derived methodology was summarised in a 5-page paper 
(Appendix C) which was circulated by email to the cohort.   
To support the CSO review, and in recognition of the considerable resource pressures clinical 
staff experience discharging their clinical roles, a short questionnaire (Appendix C) was also 
circulated.  The questionnaire posed 3 questions with a Y/N answer with the opportunity to 
add any qualifying comments as summarised in Table 13 below: 
 
Table 13 - Clinical Safety Officer Review Questions 
Question # Question 
1.  Is the research observation regarding hazard definition in the domain of health 
informatics representative? 
2.  Does the linguistic framework proposed aid meaningful hazard definition?  
3.  Are there any flaws or weakness in the proposed framework? 
 
The cohort were also encouraged to provide feedback outside of the specific questions. 
5.2.3 Cohort Feedback and Analysis 
Of the 11 CSOs approached, 9 provided responses representing all roles as described in Table 
12 above.  
The returned responses22 are summarised below in Tables 14 to 17.  The responses to each 
question are grouped by themes and subsequently analysed.  In some cases, analysis of the 
comments has resulted in specific requirements to be raised and uniquely identified as 
discussed at Section 5.  
1 of the 9 respondents provided feedback via email rather than via the question sheet and 
their views are included within the scope of Table 17. 
Whilst 1 of the targeted CSOs did not provide documented feedback, they invited me to run a 
pilot evaluation of the framework with their clinical safety team in support of the 
implementation of safety related functionality.  This is fully discussed at Section 5.4 
 
  
 
22 Permission to reproduce comments was obtained from the respondents. 
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5.2.3.1 Cohort Feedback and Analysis – Q1 
Table 14 - Review Question 1 Feedback & Analysis 
Question Y 
Response 
N 
Response 
Is the research observation regarding hazard definition in the domain 
of health informatics representative? 
8 0 
Comments 
“Agree completely with the context of the challenges of hazard definition as described.” 
“Agree – people generally ok with talking about risks but not too sure what a hazard is.” 
“The research purpose relates to the problem identified (i.e. ambiguity in the understanding 
and use of the term “hazard”).” 
“Yes, it is not uncommon to see a hazard which looks more like a cause, or in many cases they 
can be project risks rather than clinical hazards.” 
“The author correctly asserts that anecdotal evidence suggests within healthcare domain, 
hazards are associated with risks, and that the potential harm that occurs to a patient is 
rarely expressed.” 
Analysis 
This feedback reinforces the conclusions that I drew from the literature review and personal 
reflection that the concept of hazard is not widely understood and often describes a different 
element within a harm scenario e.g. the risk or a cause.   
It is apparent from the feedback that the concept of hazard needs to be promoted and 
“demystified” in the domain of health informatics.   A distinction needs to be established 
between the hazard as being a condition that exists or is established in the care-pathway that 
could potentially result in harm and risk as being a measure or metric of the significance of 
that condition in a patient harm context. 
Resolution 
Action T5.2.1 The toolkit shall describe and re-enforce the concept of a hazard and introduce 
this framework into the domain.   
Action E5.2.1 The concept of a hazard shall be described in subsequent evaluation activities.  
 
Comments 
”..will help CSO and Safety Engineers complete safety process in a consistent manner.” 
Analysis 
This feedback recognises that safety management is a collaborative process and that 
consistency in application and adherence to the management process is key. 
Resolution 
None required. 
 
Comments 
“I would agree Sean, we talk a lot about risks in health care, and from a clinical perspective 
we understand and work with it daily, when IT gets involved there is a fear and lack of 
understanding about how this becomes a risk or could impact.” 
Analysis 
This feedback suggests that the use of technology in support of care management 
introduces” fear” and care HCPs struggle to comprehend the detrimental contribution 
technology can make in the context of safe care delivery.  Again, this observation re-enforces 
the research position that clinical risk management must be considered from a health 
informatics viewpoint and not focused on the technology contribution in isolation.  As is 
articulated within the scope of this thesis, hazards must be considered in the context of 
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deviation from the intended care-pathway and an informed and expert based opinion 
established as to whether the deviation could credibly result in patient harm outcomes. 
Resolution 
Action T5.2.2 The toolkit shall re-enforce the patient care centric context in which hazard 
identification and description should be undertaken and that technology should be 
considered in the context of it contributing to a socio-technical system.  
Action E5.2.2 The patient centric context in which of a hazard shall be described in 
subsequent evaluation activities. 
 
Comments 
“I think the observation extends beyond just health informatics. It is more general amongst 
health care in my experience. Staff often quote hazards on a risk register as a “risk” and quote 
risks as a hazard on hazard logs.  The linguistic expression as a phrase with a causal 
relationship can help identify the individual components correctly.” 
Analysis 
This feedback further re-enforces other comments regarding the comprehension of the 
concept of hazard in the health care domain.  The fact that the terms risk and hazard are used 
interchangeably is concerning as it indicates a lack of consistency in the understanding and 
use of fundamental concepts in the clinical risk management process as established in the 
two CRM standards.  Further, this issue has the potential to compromise communication and 
decision making between stakeholders in a care environment if they are using different 
concepts interchangeably. 
Encouragingly, the feedback acknowledges that the proposed methodology induces a causal 
relationship to be established and considered between the different elements that exist in a 
harm scenario. 
Resolution 
None further beyond that established in Actions T5.2.1 & E5.2.1 
 
5.2.3.2 Cohort Feedback and Analysis – Q2 
Table 15 - Review Question 2 Feedback & Analysis 
Question Y 
Response 
N 
Response 
Does the linguistic methodology proposed, aid meaningful hazard 
definition? 
8 0 
Comments 
“Cause, effect, hazard and harm are better understood with the explanations provided; I 
particularly like the colour coding.” 
“I like the colours and how the hazard can be described, just to throw out there the use of 
hazard is an alien one in health care” 
“I think it does, and the coloured text really helps that stand out.” 
Analysis 
This feedback indicates that respondents consider that the framework can help to describe 
hazards and that the use of colours to identify individual concepts in a harm scenario aids 
understanding and provides emphasis.   
Again, the feedback re-iterates the research observation that the use of hazard as a concept 
in clinical risk management is unfamiliar.   
Resolution 
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None further beyond that established in Actions T5.2.1 & E5.2.1 
Comments 
“..people who will trial it need to spend quite a lot of time on making sure they understand 
the difference between the hazard and the risk.” 
Analysis 
This is a valid comment but one that, in my view, pertains to the original research 
observation i.e. that as a domain we struggle with the concept of a hazard and where it is 
used, its use does not often align with its definition. 
Resolution 
None further beyond that established in Actions T5.2.1 & E5.2.1 
 
Comments 
“I believe it does, but I would like to see it applied to more examples before being fully 
convinced.” 
Analysis 
A valid observation and one that has been addressed by the progressive nature of the 
research evaluation.  In total, this framework has been briefed to over 100 people, 
evaluated by 47 people and applied by 6 people who are all actively involved in the 
application of clinical risk management.  As is reported within the scope of this thesis, the 
feedback from this evaluation has been very positive and constructive. 
Resolution 
Non required. 
 
Comments 
“It does help to try and provide a structure / framework when describing hazards.” 
“It provides a structured framework” 
Analysis 
This feedback is encouraging and gives confidence that the original research motivation and 
objective is being addressed 
Resolution 
Non required 
 
Comments 
“The author makes a compelling case in the synergy between both the description of 
realising a benefit, linking into the key identifiers within a harm event occurring from the 
cause of a hazard to the potential of harm occurring to a patient.”    
Analysis 
The feedback recognises that the inspiration for the framework was derived from 
considering other management techniques within the NHS where I recognised a diametric 
synergy between the achievement of a business benefit and the occurrence of patient 
harm.   It is hoped that this synergy aids understanding of the framework, particularly with 
staff who have knowledge and experience in benefits management.  
Resolution 
Non required 
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Table 16-  Review Question 3 Feedback & Analysis 
Question Y 
Response 
N 
Respo
nse 
Are there any flaws or weakness in the proposed methodology? 0 8 
Comments 
“It can also be useful to state the type of hazard as part of a generic group; this can be 
done prior to describing the specific hazard or condition that can potential cause patient 
harm.” 
Analysis 
This is an important observation.  The concept of “hazard types” (Habli, et al., 2018) is 
being used to group and manage hazards that share a common theme.   
It is considered that the framework can still be applied in such scenarios.  There is a 
potential challenge in that it may be difficult to articulate the causes within the harm 
scenario if it is being considered at a high level of abstraction.  For example, its credible 
to describe at a high level a generic hazard of “incorrect medication prescribed”.  
However, when that hazard type is analysed in specific care scenarios there are likely to 
be unique causes to that specific hazard instance that don’t occur in other care scenarios: 
in paediatric care, dosage instructions are calculated based on the child’s weight (Health 
Service Executive, 2013). Weight is generally not factored into adult dosing calculations.  
It would be difficult to express this variance using the framework. This is not considered 
to be a weakness in the framework, rather a consequence of the difficulty of trying to 
articulate detail from a perspective of generality.  In such scenarios the best approach 
would be to apply the framework and either generalises the causes or omit them entirely 
from the hazard type description.  The framework would still deliver value in terms of 
describing a generic harm scenario and in establishing the starting point from which a 
specific instance of the hazard type can be described.  
Resolution 
Action T5.2.3 The toolkit needs to support application of the framework in the context of 
generic hazard types. 
 
Comments 
“.. I agree with the approach. How useful it will be in practice will be dependent on how 
pragmatic / practical the framework will be such that it can be easily understood and 
applied in practice e.g. by those populating hazard logs. This will depend on how the 
framework is ultimately described whether in academic / conceptual or pragmatic / 
practical language.” 
“I understood it, but then I have some knowledge of clinical safety, those that don’t and 
are working with the methodology may find it hard to understand, although I suppose 
they shouldn’t be using it unless they are trained? 
Analysis 
This feedback aligns with some of the responses to Question 1, pertaining to the 
understanding of a hazard in the health care domain and the competence and experience 
of those conducting `clinical risk management.  
The principle motivation for conducting this research was to take the opportunity to 
develop resources that would assist the health care domain in addressing an element of 
the clinical risk management process as established in DCB 0129 and DCB 0160.  I agree 
entirely that for this to be achieved the framework needs to be unambiguous, defined in 
simple terms and supported by effective resources.  The evaluation element of this 
research has been structured such that it seeks opinion from a wide range of 
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stakeholders and that it is progressive in that feedback from one evaluation phase is 
addressed and implemented before commencing the next phase of evaluation.   
Resolution 
No specific actions beyond that which has been addressed in the research evaluation 
design and other specific actions. 
 
Comments 
“the proposal needs to be clearly explained so that people grasp what it is trying to 
achieve. One area is in the description of the hazard equating to the practitioner context – 
could easily be misunderstood as the practitioner is the hazard.” 
Analysis 
An important observation.  The methodology presents a view that a hazard occurs in the 
context of the practitioner delivering care; this raises a concern that the practitioner 
could be viewed as being the hazard. 
There are 2 themes to be addressed here; 
1) scenarios in health informatics where there is no direct interface between the 
care practitioner and patient and  
2) the concern that the practitioner could be perceived to be the hazard. 
 
Addressing 1 
There is a (deliberate) generalisation made in the framework (and in the concept 
description of health informatics) that a practitioner always participates in the harm 
scenario, that essentially, they act as the “actuator” between the information that is 
created by technology and the care a patient subsequently receives.  Hazards 
subsequently occur at this point of integration.  As with all generalisations there are 
exceptions; the Bowel Cancer Screening Programme (BCSP)23 
https://www.gov.uk/topic/population-screening-programmes/bowel, for example, 
automatically invites people aged over 55 onto the programme.  The invitation is 
generated using date of birth information maintained on the National Health Application 
and Infrastructure Service (NHAIS) and is sent automatically to the patient without any 
clinical check.  There is a potential hazard associated with an invitation not being sent 
when it should have been sent (i.e. patient aged 55 or over and not opted out).  This can 
be described using the framework as such: 
Incorrect date of birth recorded on NHAIS results in a BCS invitation not being 
sent.  Eligible patient is not enrolled on the bowl cancer screening programme 
and their cancer goes undetected and they suffer a catastrophic deterioration in 
their health.   
However, despite there being no HCP contribution in this scenario (either as a cause or 
control), the methodology still holds as the hazard occurs in the “people” context. 
Resolution 
The generalised model of hazard in the context of HI (Appendix C) has been further 
refined (Figure 17) to compensate for those scenarios where care management or 
delivery is not administered directly by a HCP.  The generalisation still holds even in these 
scenarios; the hazard persists in the “people” context (i.e. at the interface between the 
information and patient) and not in the “technology” context.  
 
 
 
23 Potentially, this functionality should be classified as a MD as it is essentially managing patient level 
healthcare without any check or intervention by a HCP. 
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Action T5.2.4 The toolkit needs to be amended to emphasise that hazards persist in the 
“people” context which can be defined as: 
(Patient and HCP) or (Patient).   
Action E5.2.3 The concept of hazards existing in the “people” context will be emphasised 
in subsequent evaluation activities. 
 
Addressing 2 
To mitigate this concern, the framework needs to be supported by a richer definition and 
description of the hazard as a concept (i.e. as a condition that is established or exists 
within the care-pathway which has the potential to result in patient harm) and of the role 
of a practitioner (i.e. as an enabler of a patient’s care management and / or delivery).  
Further, there is a need to explain that a practitioner may also act as a cause of a hazard 
either through making an error or mistake (HSE, 2012)24 or by doing the right thing but in 
the context of mis-information.  This has been addressed and is documented at Section 
4.4.3. It was also discussed at the Digital Health Conference (Section 5.3). 
Resolution 
Action T5.2.5 The toolkit needs to support the framework by describing key concepts. 
Action E5.2.4 The toolkit needs to support the framework by describing the contribution 
a practitioner can make in a harm scenario.  
 
Comment 
“Minor comment: please, pay careful attention to the definitions of the steps and 
components of the framework” 
Analysis 
This is a significant observation and one that must be addressed to ensure that the 
framework can be understood and applied successfully.  Definition of the terms have 
been established and are summarised at Glossary of Terms.  
Resolution 
Addressed in T5.2.5 & E5.2.4. 
 
Comments 
“Not directly, although defining the hazard so close the event without allowing for 
anticipation of multiple preceding events loses the opportunity to develop a wider 
reaching control, or a common causality from multiple sources. However, the logic of the 
proposed notion seems sound.” 
Analysis 
This is valid observation but extends beyond the purpose of the framework.  The 
principle purpose of the framework is to provide a mechanism through which a 
meaningful hazard description can be established that explains the disturbance that is 
occurring in the intended care-pathway and how that could manifest as patient harm.  It 
is not intended to fulfil the requirements associated with subsequent risk evaluation 
activities (Requirements 4.4 of DCB 0129 & DCB 0160) but does naturally provide a pre-
cursor to that, albeit at a higher level of abstraction. 
 
24 Human failure can be categorised into two themes: Error and Violation.  Errors can be further 
classified as skill-based errors i.e. slips of action or lapses in memory and mistakes i.e. rule-based and 
knowledge based.  These failures are not intentional. Violations are intentional failures where a 
conscious decision is made not to d the right thing. 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/construction/lwit/assets/downloads/human-failure.pdf 
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The linguist structure captured in the hazard description can be transformed to create 
the foundations of a bow-tie model of the harm scenario; key elements of cause, hazard 
and consequence having already been established.  This is discussed at Section 4.6.  
Clearly this would not represent the complete hazard assessment but would form an 
initiating model which could subsequently be developed to include additional causes and 
associated controls. 
Resolution 
Action T5.2.6 The toolkit needs to describe how the framework can be transposed into 
an initial bow-tie model to support subsequent risk estimation activities.  
 
Comments  
Will this method still work for hazards related to human factors as well as technical? 
Analysis 
This comment needs to be considered in combination with the previous comment 
regarding the contribution of the HCP (and to a lesser extent the Patient e.g. giving 
misleading or inaccurate information to a HCP) in the harm scenario. 
The framework does not impose any restriction over the nature or type of hazard cause 
and as discussed above, the actions of the HCP may act as causes in the harm scenario.  
Causes are not always failures and simply doing the right thing may propagate the 
disturbance effect that is occurring in the care pathway.  In short, the framework can 
support description of human factor considerations which may reflect: the HCP doing the 
right thing at a given point in the care-pathway; the HCP be induced to do the wrong 
thing due to characteristics of the technology or the HCP doing the wrong thing due to a 
lack of knowledge or understanding.   
This latter point had been pre-empted and discussed at the Digital Health Conference 
(Section 5.3). 
Resolution 
See Actions T5.2.5 & E5.2.4 
 
Comment 
“Although untested, compared with the inconsistent way hazards are described by 
healthcare organisations and system suppliers in the field, the model provides further 
clarity linking all the relevant aspects in a sequential way; which allows a user to see how 
elements are interrelated through to the harm that can potentially occur to a patient. In 
this way, a new standardised methodology would potentially improve the creation of, and 
aid healthcare colleagues understanding of hazards within clinical safety within the 
clinical field. 
Analysis 
This is extremely encouraging feedback and aligns very strongly with the intent of the 
research. 
Subsequent evaluation activities (5.2.4 & 5.2.5) provide opportunity for the framework to 
be applied by staff working in clinical risk management on their own specific 
developments or deployments. 
Resolution 
None required. 
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5.2.3.3 Cohort Feedback and Analysis – Q2 
Table 17 - General Feedback & Analysis 
Comments 
Really interesting and useful MSc which I look forward to trying in practice. I completely agree 
with the challenges in describing hazards and I think this will help. I have often wondered if 
some of the difficulties has been that a hazard log only really includes 3 elements: Cause, 
Hazard and Consequence. To me it has always felt there’s a missing element which makes it 
difficult to judge whether something should be described as a cause or a hazard (or a 
consequence). Seeing the 4 elements listed and then how they are combined in both the 
flowchart in fig 4 and the Hazard example through the colours, is insightful and may help with 
that problem.  
Analysis 
Encouraging feedback which re-enforces the original research proposition. 
Resolution 
None required. 
 
Comments 
I think that the project is workable and would help to improve the understanding around 
hazards. Very few comments but all-around same thing really and that is to ensure that 
people really do understand the differences between hazards, risks and issues. 
Analysis 
Encouraging feedback that indicates that the framework is practicable and helps to address 
the original research proposition.  I agree entirely with the observation regarding people 
needing to understand the difference between a hazard and its risk; preceding action points 
will address this in the toolkit. 
Resolution 
None further beyond those actions already identified. 
 
Comments 
“It would provide strong support to demonstrate the validity of the methodology to use the 
framework for real world “hazards”” 
Analysis 
This is a valid observation which has been demonstrated through 2 key phases of the 
evaluation strategy:   
1. Section 5.1 discusses the application of the framework to a sample set of legacy 
hazards.  The resulting hazard descriptions convey a far greater understanding of the 
harm scenario; this has been endorsed by an experienced CSO.   
2. Section 5.4 discusses the application of the framework in a real-world hazard 
workshop which again demonstrated the effectiveness of the framework.  Further it 
illustrated how the results of applying the framework can be used to inform 
subsequent hazard analysis activities.  
Resolution 
None further beyond those actions already identified. 
 
 
 
Comments 
“I think the concept is a great one in understanding differences and communicating 
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effectively. 
Pragmatically, I like to categorise my “hazards” into higher level/ upstream events or themes 
which isn’t necessarily directly catered for in the model. Doing that helps me spot controls 
that can be more generally applied or prevent us getting to the event that triggers the 
hazardous situation. In essence I guess they’re Pre-hazardous situations depending on your 
definition.” 
Analysis 
Categorisation of “hazards” in this way essentially equates to the concept of “effect” in the 
framework.  A disturbance is occurring in the intended care-pathway which may or may not 
result in a condition that could propagate and result in patient harm.  Whilst the purpose of 
the framework was not intended to support hazard analysis, it emerged through the work 
that was conducted under Section 5.4, that the results of applying the framework can be 
transposed and used to construct an initial bow-tie model of the harm scenario.  Controls can 
then be identified that manage the identified causes that are related to the “upstream 
events” or effects. 
Resolution 
None further beyond those actions already identified. 
 
Comments 
“The main points I would like to make are: 
1-Terminology needs to be described very clearly as some of the terms and not used routinely 
in healthcare and there is ambiguity in the field. 
2-In my opinion, the "hazard" would be the "change" rather than the "outcome". The way I 
see it is "the outcome of the hazard is the unwanted event".” 
Analysis 
I agree entirely with point 1 and one of the principle objectives of the toolkit is to provide a 
clear definition of terms in order to support consistent application, communication and 
understanding of the harm scenario. 
With respect to point 2 “change” is a benefits management term (Baker, 2017) which equates 
to the concept of “effect” in the framework.  I wouldn’t necessarily agree that an effect, 
which is essentially a form of deviation from the intended process is always hazardous.  An 
assessment has to be made as to whether that effect can result in the creation of a condition 
that has the potential to credibly result in harm i.e.: 
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If the term ”unwanted event” is equated with harm then I would agree that is the outcome of 
the hazard.  However, as explained by Reason (Reason, 2000) it must be recognised that 
there is not always an immediate relationship between hazard and harm and that in many 
harm scenarios other causes (whether they be failure of controls or presence of contributory 
factors) need to occur. 
 
5.2.4 Summary 
This was an effective evaluation activity with 9 out of 11 CSOs providing a response.  The 
response rate is encouraging as it wold suggest that there is an interest in the research topic. 
This phase of evaluation supports substantiation of objective 1 (hazard concept), particularly 
the research observation that the concept of hazard in the health domain is not widely 
understood.     
It also supports substantiation of objective 4 (communication) that application of the 
framework results in hazard descriptions that clearly articulate the harm-scenario. 
Encouragingly, there was no feedback indicating that the research objective and outcome was 
flawed or misguided. 
This evaluation phase provided constructive feedback in key areas that has resulted in 
consideration of other influences (e.g. practitioner being perceived as the hazard) and the 
need to elaborate terms and definitions.   
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 Digital Health Conference Workshop 
March 2019 
5.3.1 Conference Context 
NHS Digital and the University of York co-hosted a 2-day digital health safety event over 27th & 
28th March 201925. The event was specifically targeted at clinicians working within the NHS, 
social care organisations and system manufacturer organisations and was attended by in 
excess of 120 people.  The majority of these delegates have attended training in clinical risk 
management and are acting as the CSO in their organisation.  (The principle communication of 
this event was via the NHS Digital Clinical Risk Management Training webpage and CSO email 
distribution list). 
I co-ran the 1st conference workshop addressing the use of safety cases in the health domain 
and took the opportunity to present the hazard definition methodology established through 
this research. 
5.3.2 Workshop Objectives 
The conference workshop was attended by 60 delegates representing a broad cross section of 
roles and levels of authority across the healthcare domain including health and care delivery 
organisations, care commissioning organisations and Health IT system manufacturers. 
The presentation is at Appendix D and supported a 30-minute discussion which communicated 
the following learning points: 
• The need to be able to define hazards in a meaningful, patient centric context in order 
to be able to subsequently conduct any credible hazard analysis and risk assessment.  
These activities are precursors to delivering a compelling safety case based on the 
implicit risk-based safety strategy established in the related CRM standards (DCB 0129 
and DCB 0160).  
• The need to think in terms of people harm context and the chain of events that can 
occur in the care-pathway that could credibly result in harm.  
• The need to consider technology in combination with information and people, 
together all forming an integrated a sociotechnical system and avoid thinking of 
hazards just in a technology failure or misuse context. 
• That harm can only occur in the context of people so hazards must also only exist in 
that context.  That neither technology nor information can directly cause harm so 
technology must be a cause of a hazard. 
• The need to think about the disturbance effect a cause has on the care-pathway that is 
being followed to manage the care of a patient 
• That people can be hazard causes but not all causes are failures; people can do the 
right thing but in doing so, continue to propagate the disturbance effect in the care-
pathway.  
Delegates were asked, as part of conference workshop feedback to answer the following two 
questions relating to this element of the presentation: 
• Do you think the hazard description technique supports meaningful description of 
Health IT related hazards? – please provide reasoning 
 
25 https://digital.nhs.uk/news-and-events/events/2019-events/digital-health-safety-conference-2019 
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• Do you think the hazard description technique will be practical to use in a hazard 
workshop? - please provide reasoning. 
Feedback was collected via a web-based survey tool which delegates could access at the time 
of the workshop (each delegate was logged-on to a desk top computer during the workshop). 
5.3.3 Conference Feedback and Analysis 
Approximately 50% (28 out of 60) of delegates provided feedback.  This is considered to be a 
sufficient sample size aligning with a typical response rate experienced by NHS Digital 
following delivery of other training events.  
The ammonised responses are at Appendix D and summarised below in Figures 24 & 25. 
 
 
Figure 24 - Meaningful Definition 
 
Figure 25 - Practical to Use 
 
As would be expected there is high correlation between individual responses to “meaningful” 
and “practical”.  Analysis of “No” and “Not Answered” response is summarised below in Table 
18:  
 
 
 
 
5, 18%
19, 68%
4, 14% No
Yes
Not Answered
4, 14%
21, 75%
3, 11%
No
Yes
Not Answered
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Table 18 - Conference Feedback Analysis 
Respondent 
# 
Meaningful Practical Comments 
7 NA NA Neither response was qualified so its not possible to 
understand the perceived weaknesses. 
9 NA Y The NA response was not qualified; the response to 
the Y response indicates that the respondent 
endorses the methodology.  It is reasonable to 
assume the NA is an outlier and should have been 
recorded as Y.  
13 N N Neither response was qualified so its not possible to 
understand the perceived weaknesses. 
14 N N Neither response was qualified so its not possible to 
understand the perceived weaknesses.  
16 N N Both responses were qualified with reference to the 
SMART tool26 and a expression of disappointment in 
the workshop.  Reclassified as an outlier. 
18 N/A N/A Both responses were qualified through a statement 
relating to a lack of opportunity to apply the 
methodology. 
21 N N Neither response was qualified so its not possible to 
understand the perceived weaknesses. 
22 NA NA Neither response was qualified so its not possible to 
understand the perceived weaknesses. 
25 N Y Response to N was qualified with reference to the 
SMART tool but there was a positive response to 
practical application.  It is reasonable to assume the 
N is an outlier and should have been recorded as Y. 
 
Consolidating these observations gives a revised reflection on the considered effectiveness and 
practicality of the proposed methodology which is summarised in Figure 26:  
 
Figure 26 - Consolidated Feedback 
 
26 See section 4.5 
3, 11%
21, 78%
3, 11% No
Yes
Not Answered
P a g e  76 | 154 
 
5.3.4 Summary 
This was an effective evaluation activity with 28 out of 60 delegates providing a response.  This 
aligns with the response rate routinely experienced by NHS Digital in feedback to their CRM 
training courses. 
This phase of evaluation supports substantiation of objective 1 (hazard concept) and objective 
4 (communication).  75% of delegates considered that the methodology does support 
meaningful description of care centric, Health IT related hazards. 
It also supports substantiation of objective 3 (practice).  75% of delegates considered that the 
methodology could be used in practice. 
12 delegates provided qualitative feedback to support their Y/N answers.  Of these, 5 made 
comments relating to other aspects of the workshop.  All other feedback aligned with the 
themes raised and discussed in Section 5.2.  
Given the limited time to communicate the methodology, the large number of delegates and 
the variance in their roles and experience of conducting CRM it is considered that this 
evaluation provides strong qualitative evidence that the framework addresses the research 
objectives and that it is considered practical to use within the health care domain.  
Importantly, no responses were raised that countered the objectives. 
 
 Application in a Pilot Study 
The pilot study was conducted to support the implementation and subsequent use of the 
National Early Warning Score (NEWS)27  in the context of acute care within the NHS. 
It must be noted that descriptions and diagrams presented here have been purposefully 
simplified and generalised to maintain manufacturer confidentiality; the workshop was 
supported by more detailed resources.   The generalisation presented herein does not distract 
from or undermine the workshop process and its conclusions.  
5.4.1 Clinical Context 
NEWS has been developed and by the Royal College of Physicians (RCP); Version 2 (Royal 
College of Physicians, 2017) has been endorsed by NHS England and NHS Improvement as the 
early warning system to be used for identifying acutely ill patients in hospitals within England. 
NEWS uses a relatively simple algorithm based on an aggregated scoring system to generate an 
overall score.  The score is derived from the measurement of the following 6 physiological 
parameters which are routinely measured and recorded as part of existing acute care 
management practice: 
1. Respiration rate 
2. Oxygen saturation 
3. Systolic blood pressure 
4. Pulse rate 
5. Level of consciousness or new confusion 
6. temperature 
 
27 NEWS has been developed by Royal College of Physicians and endorsed by NHS England and NHS 
Improvement as an early warning system to identify acutely ill patients. 
 https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/projects/outputs/national-early-warning-score-news-2 
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Each parameter is allocated a score where the magnitude of the score reflects the extreme the 
parameter varies from the normal value.  The total score for all parameters is then aggregated 
to create a NEWS.   
5.4.2 Implementation Context 
The NEWS algorithm is being implemented into an acute Electronic Patient Record (EPR) 
system that is widely used within the NHS.  Values for the 6 parameters, which are recorded 
and stored in the individual patient record within the EPR as part of the routine care-pathway, 
are used by the implemented algorithm to create a patient’s NEWS.  If the NEWS exceeds a 
pre-defined value, an alert is generated to which nursing staff respond and triage the patient.  
A clinical decision is then made as to whether specialist care is needed.  The alert can be 
suppressed in particular scenarios e.g. if the patient is in intensive care.    
Figure 27 summarises NEWS in its clinical and implementation context. 
 
 
Key  
 
 
 
 
Activity conducted in care-pathway 
 
 
 
 
Decision made in care-pathway 
 
Figure 27 - NEWS Implementation Model 
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5.4.3 Hazard Workshop  
The purpose of a hazard workshop is to identify hazards associated with the programme of 
work that is being undertaken.  The scope of the workshop is related to the phase of the 
lifecycle the programme is at e.g. design, use or decommissioning.  Successive hazard 
workshops are often conducted, especially so where the scope or nature of the work changes.  
To be most effective, a hazard workshop should be conducted early in the lifecycle phase in 
order to have an influence over subsequent activities.   
The hazard workshop conducted in support of this thesis focused on the deployment and 
subsequent use phases of the project; initial development and implementation had already 
been undertaken. 
The following roles participated in the hazard workshop: 
• Clinical Consultant x3 
• Solution Consultant x2 
• Lead Regulatory Strategist 
 
The purpose of the workshop was to: 
• Explain the hazard description methodology to a cohort of clinical and technical staff 
actively involved in clinical risk activities in support of the development and 
deployment of Health IT 
• Apply the methodology in order to establish meaningful, patient harm centric hazards 
• Evaluate the merits of the methodology in the context of the research objectives. 
The scope of the workshop was purposefully reduced to exclude the potential hazards 
associated with the activities conducted by the Response Team.  The rationale for this being 
that the actions of the Response Team are not influenced by the NEWS and its implementation 
beyond the initial decision to engage them. 
5.4.4 Hazard Workshop Activities 
5.4.4.1 Methodology Briefing 
In advance of the workshop, the original briefing paper used in support Targeted CSO 
Evaluation (Section 5.2) was circulated to all participants. 
A presentation was delivered at the start of the workshop.  The presentation was derived from 
that delivered at the Digital Health Conference (Section 5.3), addressing points of 
improvement actions identified through on-going evaluation. 
5.4.4.2 Application of Methodology 
The methodology was applied within the framework of SWIFT (see Section 2.6) which is 
practiced by the organisation.  The organisation also use swim-lane diagrams to describe the 
care pathway, identifying roles (technology and people) the flow of information between the 
roles and the activities and decisions the roles perform.  These diagrams provide a 
comprehensive and representative model of care delivery which is amenable to deviation 
analysis.  
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The following stepwise process was followed; 
 
1. Identify human activities / decisions close to care delivery outcomes 
Rationale: methodology establishes that hazards occur at the interface between the 
HCP and patient. 
 
2. Apply SWIFT to appraise whether the identify activity / decision could credibly result in 
harm either through the intended activity / decision being made or an unintended 
activity being made at this point in the care-pathway. 
Rationale: methodology establishes that hazards exist if there is a related and credible 
harm outcome. 
 
3. If the activity / decision is considered to be hazardous then annotate as such in the 
model (green in the methodology schema).  Capture the patient harm consequences 
that may occur as a result of the hazard 
Rationale: The purpose of SWIFT is to identify hazards. 
 
4. For those activities / decisions identified to be hazardous, systematically step through 
the care-pathway model and consider whether a disturbance at this point in the 
process has an effect on the care-pathway that may result in the identified hazard. 
Rationale: methodology establishes that disturbance effects that cause deviation from 
what was intended to be done in the care-pathway can result in hazards. 
 
5. If the activity / decision is considered to be an effect, then annotate as such in the 
model (red in the methodology schema) 
 
6. For those activities / decisions identified to be effects, systematically step through the 
care-pathway model and consider whether the activity / decision is a cause of the 
previously identified effect 
Rationale: methodology establishes that causes induce a disturbance effect in the 
care-pathway. 
 
7. If the activity / decision is considered to be a cause, then annotate as such in the 
model (blue in the methodology schema) 
 
8. From the model and using the colour coding, populate the worksheet to construct a 
hazard description. 
5.4.5 Hazard workshop Results 
5.4.5.1 Response Team Engaged When They Are Not 
Needed 
This scenario considers the circumstances under which the Response Team are engaged when 
there is no clinical need.  
Application of the methodology is depicted at Figure 28 and explained at Table 19 
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Figure 28 - Application of Framework to Care-pathway Model 
 
Table 19 - Framework Application Rationale 
Process Step Classification & Rationale 
PATIENT NEEDS URGENT 
CARE 
Potential point of hazard. 
The purpose of NEWS and subsequent alert is to make 
nursing staff aware of a specific patient’s deteriorating health 
and to prioritise and initiate a nursing assessment from which 
an informed decision can be made as to whether specialised 
response team need to be engaged.  
If the alert is erroneously generated and the Nurse 
subsequently makes an erroneous assessment, they could 
engage the Response Team in circumstances where they are 
not required.  This may disturb the wellbeing28 of the patient 
and may have a detrimental impact on the provision of 
Response Team service across the organisation. 
 
28 DCB 0129 & DCB 0160 define harm as being “Death, physical injury, psychological trauma and/or 
damage to the health or well-being of a patient.” 
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Process Step Classification & Rationale 
NURSE ASSESSES PATIENT Effect 
The nurse assesses the patient in response to the alert but 
draws the wrong conclusion on the health of the patient.  
ALERT GENERATED Effect 
The alert is generated in circumstances where it should not 
be which has a subsequent effect on the actions of the Nurse. 
Note In this scenario there is an assumption being made that 
the alert is operating correctly and that there are down-
stream causes which cause the alert to be generated 
SCORE ABOVE THRESHOLD Cause 
Incorrect design or implementation may result in an 
erroneously high NEWS.  
EWS CALCULATED Cause 
Incorrect design or implementation may result in a low NEWS 
causing an alert trigger.  
 
From this mapping and rationale, the hazard description can be constructed as illustrated in 
Table 20: 
Table 20 - Hazard Description Composition 
 
 
Cause Erroneously high EWS score is calculated by Health IT 
Or 
Health IT erroneously determines score is above alert threshold 
Effect EWS alert is generated when it should not be, and Nurse makes incorrect 
assessment of the patient 
Hazard Response Team are engaged when they should be 
Harm Patient becomes distressed. 
 
Erroneously high EWS score or score deemed to be higher than threshold results in alert being 
generated and the Nurse subsequently makes an incorrect assessment of the patient.  
Response Team are engaged in circumstances where they are required which causes the 
patient to become distressed.  
  
Cause Effect Hazard Harm
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5.4.5.2 Hazard: Response Team Not Engaged When 
They Are Needed 
This scenario considers the circumstances under which the Response team are not engaged 
when they should be i.e. when a patient’s condition is deteriorating to a point where their 
NEWS reaches the threshold value.  
Application of the methodology is depicted at Figure 29 and explained at Table 21: 
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Figure 29 - Application of Framework to Care-pathway Model 
Table 21 - Framework Application Rationale 
Process Step Classification & Rationale 
PATIENT NEEDS 
URGENT CARE 
Potential point of hazard. 
The purpose of NEWS and subsequent alert is to make nursing staff 
aware of a specific patient’s deteriorating health and to prioritise and 
initiate a nursing assessment from which an informed decision can be 
made as to whether specialised response team need to be engaged.  
If the alert is not generated or is suppressed, then the likelihood of a 
deteriorating patient’s condition going unmanaged is likely to 
increase.  
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Process Step Classification & Rationale 
NURSE ASSESSES 
PATIENT 
Effect 
The nurse does not conduct an assessment of the patient despite 
their deteriorating condition. 
ALERT GENERATED Effect 
The alert is not generated in circumstances where it should which has 
a subsequent effect on the actions of the Nurse. 
Note In this scenario there is an assumption being made that the alert 
is operating correctly and that there are down-stream causes which 
mask the requirement for the alert to be generated.  There is an 
alternative scenario in which the alert can be a cause i.e. it fails to 
generate the alert.  It must be remembered that the purpose of this 
methodology is not to conduct hazard analysis but to construct a 
hazard description that articulates the harm scenario which in term 
begins to inform the hazard analysis. 
SCORE ABOVE 
THRESHOLD 
Cause 
Incorrect design or implementation may result in valid high NEWS 
being considered to be below the trigger threshold which has the 
effect of the alert not being generated. 
EWS CALCULATED Cause 
Incorrect design or implementation may result in an erroneously low 
NEWS which has the effect of the alert not being generated. 
 
From this mapping and rationale, the hazard description can be constructed as illustrated in 
Table 22: 
Table 22 - Hazard Description Composition 
 
 
Cause Erroneously low EWS score is calculated by Health IT 
Or 
Health IT erroneously determines score is below alert threshold 
Effect EWS alert is not generated when it should be so Nurse does not assess 
patient 
Hazard Response Team are not engaged when they should be 
Harm Deterioration in the patient’s condition (onset of sepsis). 
 
Erroneously low EWS score or score deemed to be lower than threshold results in alert not 
being generated when it should and subsequent and necessary patient assessment is not 
conducted by the nurse.  Response Team are not engaged in circumstances where they are 
required which results in a deterioration in the patient’s condition (onset of sepsis). 
Cause Effect Hazard Harm
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5.4.6 Hazard Workshop Feedback and Analysis 
5.4.6.1 Hazard Workshop Outcomes 
The time spent at the workshop in applying the methodology was limited to about 20 minutes 
(time was needed to explain the methodology to delegates, to discuss and understand the care 
pathway and to observe a demonstration of the development system).  However, this was 
enough to be able to establish the description of the two harm scenarios discussed above.   A 
significant contributing factor in achieving this outcome in a short period of time was the 
quality of the swim-lane models the organisation had developed. 
The people roles provided a focus for identifying potential hazards and automatically 
prevented conversation and deliberation of lower level causes being established as hazards 
(without of any direct and obvious relationship to patient harm consequences). 
The description constructs could be readily super-imposed over the model and as such 
directed the discussion and confirmation of the harm scenario.  It was observed that 
conversation remained focused to the particular element of the model being analysed.  One of 
the weaknesses of a SWIFT type approach to hazard identification is that if it is not carefully 
managed there is a danger that it can wander of track and focus is lost. 
Subsequent to the workshop, the organisation has applied the methodology to other areas of 
the care-process, applied it to address some of the specificity which has been generalised in 
the thesis and are appraising its future use as a constituent element of their CRM process (see 
5.4.6.2) 
Two specific points were raised during the course; these and my responses are summarised in 
Table 23 
Table 23 - Workshop Discussion Points 
Comment  Response 
Would applying this technique result in the 
creation of a large number of hazards. 
My view is that application of the 
methodology in the workshop demonstrated 
that by focusing on the patient, hazards are in 
fact established at a higher level of 
abstraction.  By working backwards from the 
point of the hazard through the care-
pathway, we can readily identify causes and 
the effect they have on the ability to 
discharge the intended care-pathway.  We 
can then start to think about controls and 
mitigation strategies and where best to apply 
them to greatest effect (as close to the 
source as possible). 
Doesn’t the methodology oversimplify the 
CRM work that needs to be conducted. 
In applying this methodology, I’m not 
suggesting we are simplifying the work that 
needs to be done; obviously the necessary 
analysis and justification still needs to be 
undertaken, but by constructing a structed 
description of the hazard early in the process 
the harm context becomes apparent and it 
provides direction as to where to focus our 
resources to achieve optimum outcomes. 
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Feedback29 was provided following the workshop and is summarised at Table 24: 
 
Table 24 - Workshop Feedback 
Question Y/N Comments 
Is the research observation 
regarding hazard definition 
in the domain of health 
informatics representative? 
 
Y “Talking about hazards in healthcare is still challenging 
as many institutions are very much risk averse. Having 
a methodology that brings the language of hazard 
close to the user will for sure be helpful when it comes 
to view clinical hazards as opportunities to improve 
practices and patient safety. “ 
Does the linguistic 
methodology proposed aid 
meaningful hazard 
definition?  
 
Y “It is a much more intuitive, easy to use tool when 
compared to a more traditional What if analysis. 
This methodology can bring up to speed even people 
with little experience identifying hazards as looks at the 
processes as a whole and not individual components. 
From a clinical perspective it relates to what clinicians 
would empirically identify as a hazard themselves and 
therefore makes the process more solution specific.”  
Do you think the 
methodology could be 
incorporated into your 
organisation’s clinical 
safety management 
system? 
Y “This methodology has been presented to the Clinical 
Risk Management Committee for analysis and 
discussion and materials supplied by the author (Sean 
white) disseminated to members of the committee. “ 
 
5.4.6.2 Informing Hazard Analysis 
As discussed at Section 4.6, by applying rigour in the derivation and construction of a patient 
centric, hazard description there is an opportunity to inform and initiate subsequent hazard 
analysis activities. 
The bow-tie methodology is widely used in safety related industries and is promoted by NHS 
Digital in their CRM training and the methodology is embedded within SMART.  The 
methodology uses simple graphical notation to represent the relationship between hazards, 
their causes, consequences and controls. 
The hazard description established by applying the research methodology can be readily 
transposed to establish the basis of a bow-tie model.  This is illustrated in Figure 30 for the 
hazard Response Team are not engaged when they should be. 
 
29 Approval to reproduce the comments has been granted. 
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Figure 30 - Informing Hazard Analysis 
Obviously, this is not a complete and exhaustive analysis; there are some obvious omissions 
such as: 
• The nurse making an incorrect assessment 
• The subsequent actions of Response Team 
But importantly, in applying the hazard description methodology and transposing it into bow-
tie establishes a systematic approach to the early phases and CRM building communication, 
traceability and rigour into the process and improving comprehension of the harm scenario by 
stakeholders. 
5.4.6.3 Hazard Workshop Follow-up 
A second meeting was convened with the organisation to review their independent application 
of the framework.  Table 25 summarises the qualitative feedback that was provided and the 
discussion points that followed:  
Table 25 - Follow-up Workshop Feedback  
Observation Discussion points 
“Framework has been reviewed and applied 
in full NEWS care-pathway from a 
perspective of care delivery” (extending 
beyond initial limited scope of original 
workshop)  
Noted; additional hazards that were 
identified and described are presented at 
Table 5.4.6-2.   
“Hazard outcomes became generic” This is to be expected if CRM is conducted in 
the context of patient centric care-pathways.  
NEWS has been developed to provide a 
single care benefit i.e. alert HCPs to the 
potential deterioration in a patient’s health 
and initiate a nursing intervention.  From a 
harm perspective the outcomes are limited 
but there will be different harm-scenarios in 
which it may result.   
Response 
Team are not 
engaged 
when they 
should be
Erroneously 
low EWS 
score is 
calculated 
by HIT
HIT 
erroneously 
determines 
score is 
below alert 
threshold
Deterioration in 
the patient s 
condition.
EWS alert is 
not 
generated so 
Nurse does 
not assess 
patient
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Observation Discussion points 
“Not time consuming but it seemed difficult 
to use initially.” 
“Applying the framework and establishing 
the constructs can be difficult, intuitively 
know what the hazard is” 
“Traditional approach of SWIFT takes longer” 
An element of the “difficult” was associated 
with understanding the purpose and 
relationship of the different constructs.  This 
did improve through further use of the 
framework. 
The intuition of clinicians is recognised and 
the two CRM standards harness this through 
the requirements for a CSO.  The challenge is 
being able to capture, articulate and 
communicate this understanding into the 
CRM process.  Without being able to do so, 
the effectiveness of the subsequent CRM 
activities and the confidence in the 
supporting safety case can be compromised.  
In being able to identify the point for 
potential harm in the care pathway meant 
that discussion could be managed around 
that viewpoint and it was observed that 
there was less digression as often can occur 
when using SWIFT. 
“Not confident that it captures all the 
hazards.” 
A fair point.  It was suggested that being 
systematic and identifying and assessing all 
points of interaction between the HCP and 
the patient a claim of completeness could be 
made with a high degree of confidence.  The 
challenge of demonstrating completeness 
becomes even more challenging when the 
approach to hazard identification and 
definition is undertaken in a random and 
unstructured way.  It was further suggested 
that if it becomes difficult to identify 
additional patient harm outcomes then it is 
fair to claim that this initial phase of CRM 
has been addressed. 
“Potential to use the structured description 
to simplify the hazard log e.g. by removing 
existing columns.  This is something that is 
being evaluated.” 
Indeed, by having consistent structure in the 
hazard description negates the need to 
capture and manage different elements of 
the hazard log.  Reading and assimilating 
disparate chunks of information can be 
problematic. 
“Positive response within the organisation 
when it was briefed during a recent CRM 
meeting.” 
This is encouraging and an independent 
conversation with the Lead Regulatory 
Strategist indicates that the framework is to 
be embedded within the organisations 
CRMS. 
 
 
The host organisation has a mature and effective clinical risk management process in place 
with dedicated and knowledgeable staff who are responsible and accountable for ensuring the 
process is embedded into their programmes.  Following the pilot study, the organisation has 
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recognised that their legacy hazard descriptions are not always expressed in the context of 
patient harm outcomes and have suggested that they will be reviewed.  
Additionally, the organisation is planning to adopt the methodology to support future hazard 
identification activities and have initiated this by running internal communication events. 
5.4.7 Summary 
This phase of evaluation supports substantiation of objective 2 (care context) and objective 4 
(communication).  Participants in the workshop agreed that hazards described using the 
framework are expressed relative to the care-pathway and potential patient harm outcomes. 
It also supports substantiation of objective 3 (practice).  The organisation was able to apply the 
framework outside of the workshop and are of the view that it will save time.  There is an 
overhead of learning but this is to be expected with the introduction of any new work process.  
The strongest demonstration of the value of this research is the endorsement made by the 
organisation’s Lead Regulatory Strategist who has promoted the framework internally to 
members of the Clinical Risk Management Group.  Further there seems to be an appetite for 
the organisation to embed the framework within their CRMS and to review the efficacy of their 
existing hazard descriptions and the structure of their hazard log. 
 
 Training Course Module and Evaluation 
5.5.1 Training Course Context 
NHS Digital run a national programme of training in CRM30 that aligns with the requirements of 
DCB 0129 & DCB 0160.  The training comprises 3 elements; a foundational level of e-learning; a 
supplementary hands-on foundation course and a community of interest course.   
To support further evaluation of the framework I have developed a training module (Appendix 
E) for delivery within the community of interest course.  The purpose of this course is to 
deliver emergent themes in technology and CRM practice.  It is aimed at knowledgeable and 
experienced delegates who are typically actively employed in the role of CSO within their 
organisations.   It is intended that this training will be incorporated into the foundation training 
course and that the methodology will become the defacto way of defining hazards within the 
NHS and its supplier base. 
I delivered the training module on 14th May 2019.   28 delegates attended the course of which 
13 provided feedback.  The profile of the respondents is summarised below in Table 26 and 
includes representatives from a wide range of stakeholders: 
 
Table 26 - CSCOI Delegates 
CSO Profile Number of 
delegates 
Manufacturer 
Providing technologies and systems, including Medical Devices, to the NHS 
and private health providers. 
4 
NHS Trust 
NHS funded organisation that provides acute and community care services. 
5 
 
30https://digital.nhs.uk/services/solution-assurance/the-clinical-safety-team/clinical-risk-management-
training 
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CSO Profile Number of 
delegates 
Medical Data Provider 
Providing drug databases for 3rd party integration into Health IT systems. 
1 
Independent Consultant 
Providing consultancy services in CRM to a variety of organisations. 
1 
Regulatory Authority 
UK Government organisation responsible for licencing of Medical Devices. 
1 
General Practice 
NHS funded organisation that provides primary care services. 
1 
5.5.2 Training Course Analysis and Feedback 
Feedback was collected as part of the training course evaluation process.  Delegates were 
asked to answer the two questions summarised in Table 27 with the opportunity to add any 
qualifying comments.   
Table 27 - Clinical Safety Officer Review Questions 
Question 
# 
Question 
1.  Do you think the hazard description framework helps to establish meaningful 
hazard descriptions? 
2.  Do you think the hazard description framework will be practical to use? 
 
The returned responses31 are summarised below in Tables 28 & 29. The responses to each 
question are grouped by themes and subsequently analysed.  Corrective actions are specified 
where deficiencies in the methodology are identified. 
The module was timetabled at the end of the course and with hindsight it is apparent that this 
had an impact on delivery and possibly interpretation and understanding of the training as 
reflected in some of the comments.  Two principle reasons have been identified: 
• The course was over-running so the amount of time dedicated to this module was cut-
short This meant that the material was delivered at pace with not sufficient time to 
fully explain the methodology and reflect on learning outcomes. 
• The module was delivered at the end of the course which probably had an impact on 
the delegate’s ability to absorb and understand the learning.   
 
Table 28 - Review Question 1 Feedback & Analysis 
Question Y 
Response 
N 
Response 
Do you think the hazard description framework helps to establish 
meaningful hazard descriptions? 
13 0 
Comments 
“Interesting and helpful definition of a hazard - but a bit different from the Bow Tie concept - 
which is a potential harm to a patient. Both concepts have their strengths and I think the 
important thing is to have a clear definition which is then used consistently throughout the 
risk management work-flow.” 
 
 
31 Permission to reproduce comments was obtained from the respondent. 
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Analysis 
This feedback possibly reflects the fact that delivery of the module was rushed.  I did try and 
explain that the purpose of the methodology was to support a structured and patient centric 
description of the harm scenario and that its purpose was not that of hazard analysis.  The 
module did explain that by using models to capture the care pathway, the methodology can 
be superimposed on that model and in turn an initial bow-tie diagram could be developed to 
form the basis of subsequent hazard analysis.  The following abstracts from the training 
module illustrates this in the context of the National Early Warning Score (NEWS) 
functionality:  
 
Simplified model of NEWS with elements of the methodology superimposed: 
 
  
 
From which a hazard description can be established: 
 
Low EWS score or score deemed to be lower than threshold results in alert not being 
generated when it should and subsequent and necessary patient assessment is not 
conducted by the nurse.  Response Team are not engaged in circumstances where 
they are required which results in a deterioration in the patient’s condition. 
Which in turn can be transposed into an initial bow-tie diagram: 
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I would suggest that the methodology is complimentary and a pre-cursor to bow-tie analysis 
rather than being a different approach. 
Resolution 
Action T5.5.1 Ensure sufficient time for module delivery. 
Action T5.5.2 Ensure that the purpose of the methodology and its applicability in the CRM 
process is clearly articulated in the training 
 
Comments 
“It helps to break it down in to understandable and practical steps as I think hazard and risk 
plus impact can be confusing.” 
Yes, because so many people in project teams and front-line care still don't know the 
difference between Risk, issue, hazard, incident etc.” 
Analysis 
This feedback is encouraging and aligns with the research observations and objectives. 
Resolution 
None required. 
 
Comments 
“Would need to apply it to my own examples to see if it adds any value.” 
I will be spending some time trying to incorporate the framework into my assessment of 
hazards and risks. 
Analysis 
It would be interesting to follow-up this up. 
Resolution 
None required. 
 
Comments 
I found it easy to follow and the colour coded element simplified the process. 
Analysis 
This is encouraging feedback and aligns with similar comments made at Table 5.2.3-2 
Resolution 
Non required 
 
 
 
Response 
Team are not 
engaged 
when they 
should be
Erroneously 
low EWS 
score is 
calculated 
by HIT
HIT 
erroneously 
determines 
score is 
below alert 
threshold
Deterioration in 
the patient s 
condition.
EWS alert is 
not 
generated so 
Nurse does 
not assess 
patient
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Table 29 - Table Review Question 2 Feedback & Analysis 
Question Y Response N Response 
Do you think the hazard description framework will be 
practical to use? 
13 0 
Comments 
“Only really for smaller projects.” 
Analysis 
It would have been useful if this feedback could have been further substantiated.   
I don’t believe that application of the framework and its effectiveness will be constrained by 
the size of the project.  It is considered that this framework promotes the consideration of 
constituent elements of a harm scenario in a systematic and relational way, retaining focus 
on the potential of patient harm.  This view is substantiated in the context of the evaluation 
documented at Section 5.4 where the framework was applied to a large-scale project. 
There is an area of weakness in the framework in circumstances where a large number of 
causes are identified and the difficulty in expressing these in natural language.  As previously 
discussed, the purpose of the framework is not to support hazard analysis and care should 
be taken when applying the framework that causes are expressed at a suitably high level; 
the detail of which would be detailed in the subsequent hazard analysis activities.  A 
worksheet and an example of using it to develop the hazard description was presented in 
the training: 
 
From the previous NEWS model: 
 
 
Leads to  
Low EWS score or score deemed to be lower than threshold results in alert not being 
generated when it should and subsequent and necessary patient assessment is not 
conducted by the nurse.  Response Team are not engaged in circumstances where 
they are required which results in a deterioration in the patient’s condition. 
Resolution 
See Action T5.5.2 
 
Comments 
“Might be difficult to get to this granular detail on bigger projects- but maybe that’s where 
the Agile approach would help?” 
Analysis 
This feedback is similar to the preceding comment and one made in the workshop 
evaluation (Section 5.3).  I would counter the observation; the purpose of the framework is 
to establish a high-level description of the harm scenario and not document the subsequent 
hazard analysis where the granular detail of the harm scenario would be established e.g. 
low-level causes and their associated controls.  Applying the framework and identifying the 
constituent concepts in their relational sequence establishes a chain of thought that 
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naturally leads into more detailed analysis of the scenario.  
Resolution 
None required. 
 
Comments 
“But be aware that people will 'adjust' it to fit their workflows and mindsets. However, 
keeping the basics in mind when writing up Safety Cases will help.” 
Analysis 
An important comment.  This observation aligns with the overarching philosophy embedded 
within the practice of CRM in the NHS.  The two CRM standards establish a framework of 
requirements, supported by implementation guidance, that lead an organisation through 
the process of CRM.  It is not prescriptive and does not dictate how CRM must be 
conducted.   
This framework has been developed to align with this philosophy; obviously it can be 
adopted and used as described and established in this thesis; similarly, there may be a need 
to “localise” it to align with organisational terms and concepts.  However, the “basics” do 
need to be adhered to i.e. recognising that there are different elements in a harm scenario 
and a sequential relationship between these elements. 
Resolution 
None required. 
 
 Summary 
This was an effective evaluation activity with 13 out of 28 delegates providing a response.  This 
aligns with the response rate routinely experienced by NHS Digital in feedback to their CRM 
training courses. 
This phase of evaluation supports substantiation of objective 3 (practice).  100% of delegates 
considered that the methodology could be used in practice. 
It also supports substantiation of objective 4 (communication).   100% of delegates considered 
that the framework aids an understanding of the harm-scenario. 
The intention is that this module will be incorporated into NHS Digital’s CRM training 
programme. 
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6 Research Conclusions  
Safety management of Health IT in the NHS is a relatively new discipline with the related 
standards not becoming effective until 2009 and not being formalised under the Health & 
Social Care Act until 2013.  The concept of hazard is a fundamental element of the standards  
but other research and personal experience would indicate that it is not universally 
understood nor used within the health domain.  The initial objective of this research (1.3i 
Section 1.3) was to substantiate this observation and understand the reasons why.  
Whilst the literature review did reveal some use of the hazard as a proactive risk management 
concept the predominate theme and approach to risk management in the domain was shown 
to be that of reactive management with a strong emphasis on incidents.  The qualitative 
appraisal of legacy hazards revealed that hazards are largely expressed in terms of technical 
failures, defects, human error or mis-information and often the potential harm impact to the 
patient is not captured.   
The conclusions of this element of the research supported the second research objective 1.3ii 
Section 1.3) of providing a methodology that would support the domain in defining hazards 
that reflected meaningful and credible harm scenarios.  
The approach taken was to establish a framework that would promote a patient centric view 
of a scenario and instil a structured thought process derived from key concepts that 
collectively provide the environment in which health IT supports care management and 
delivery. 
The framework that has been developed is derived from best practice that is applied in 
benefits management within the NHS.   It provides a simple structure of sequential constructs 
which exist in a particular context of a health-related socio-technical system.  An ontology has 
been developed which can be used to derive and establish the hazard description.  
Alternatively, the constructs can be superimposed on care-pathway models to achieve the 
same result.  The structure and sequence that is instilled within the hazard description can be 
transposed into a bow-tie model, initiating the next phase of hazard analysis whilst ensuring 
traceability and continuity between CRM activities. 
Application of the framework is not constrained or dependant on a particular hazard 
identification process and can be applied in combination with or independently of any. 
The framework has been subjected to a diverse and extensive programme of evaluation, 
including practical application.  Feedback and analysis have been positive and convergent and 
indicates that the framework does address the research objective and is practical to use. 
My personal motivation for embarking on this programme of research was to gain an 
opportunity to address a challenge within the NHS and to devise a solution to address it.  I am 
pleased with the outcome and even more so with the uptake of the work within an external 
organisation and its inclusion within the national CRM training programme.  This provides a 
real opportunity to foster a systematic approach to describing hazards that are relevant to the 
care-pathway in which they exist and to the patient harm outcomes that may result.  
The status of specific actions and requirements raised during this research are summarised in 
Table 30 
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Table 30 - Research Actions 
Requirement Description Resolution 
T5.2.1 The toolkit shall describe and re-enforce the 
concept of a hazard and introduce this 
framework into the domain 
This has been addressed in 
the CRM Training Module 
and will be addressed in the 
other toolkit elements (see 
Future Work Section 7) 
T5.2.2 The toolkit shall re-enforce the patient care 
centric context in which hazard identification 
and description should be undertaken and 
that technology should be considered in the 
context of it contributing to a socio-technical 
system. 
This has been addressed in 
the CRM Training Module 
and will be addressed in the 
other toolkit elements (see 
Future Work Section 7) 
T5.2.3 The toolkit needs to support application of 
the framework in the context of generic 
hazard types. 
This has been addressed in 
the CRM Training Module 
and will be addressed in the 
other toolkit elements (see 
Future Work Section 7) 
T5.2.4 The toolkit needs to be amended to 
emphasise that hazards persist in the 
“people” context which can be defined as: 
(Patient and HCP) or (Patient 
This has been addressed as 
per Section 4.4.3 and 
incorporated into the CRM 
Training Module. 
T5.2.5 The toolkit needs to support the framework 
by describing key concepts 
This has been addressed as 
per Section 4.4.3 and 
incorporated into the CRM 
Training Module 
T5.2.6 The toolkit needs to describe how the 
framework can be transposed into an initial 
bow-tie model to support subsequent risk 
estimation activities 
This has been addressed in 
the CRM Training Module 
and will be addressed in the 
other toolkit elements (see 
Future Work Section 7) 
T5.5.1 Ensure sufficient time for module delivery Delivery of CRM Module will 
be practiced in advance of 
1st formal training course.  
Independent evaluation of 
content and timing will be 
conducted. 
T5.5.2 Ensure that the purpose of the methodology 
and its applicability in the CRM process is 
clearly articulated in the training 
This has been addressed in 
the CRM Training Module 
and will be addressed in the 
other toolkit elements (see 
Future Work Section 7) 
E5.2.1 The concept of a hazard shall be described in 
subsequent evaluation activities 
The concept of hazard was 
defined and discussed in 
subsequent evaluation 
activities. 
E5.2.2 The patient centric context in which a hazard 
exists shall be described in subsequent 
evaluation activities. 
This was addressed in 
subsequent evaluation 
activities. 
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Requirement Description Resolution 
E5.2.3 The concept of hazards existing in the 
“people” context will be emphasised in 
subsequent evaluation activities 
This was addressed in 
subsequent evaluation 
activities. 
E5.2.3 The toolkit needs to support the framework 
by describing the contribution a practitioner 
can make in a harm scenario 
This was addressed in 
subsequent evaluation 
activities. 
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7 Future Work 
 Toolkit 
The original research objective identified the establishment of a “toolkit”; this needs to be 
completed and formalised.  The toolkit will be made up of 4 tools, the status of which are 
discussed below: 
NHS Digital CRM Foundation Module:  This has been developed and is derived from 
that delivered and discussed at Section 5.5.  It is currently with the NHS Digital TRG for 
formal incorporation into the national training course.  Current forecast is that this will 
be delivered from September 2019. 
CRM Learning Resources: A “hazard identification how to guide” is being compiled 
based of the findings of this research.  A significant element of the narrative at Section 
4 and Section 5.4 is being used and will be complemented by examples of application 
of the framework.  This will be issued under NHS Digital configuration control and be 
hosted on the Clinical Safety website:  
https://digital.nhs.uk/services/solution-assurance/the-clinical-safety-team/clinical-
safety-documentation.  Current forecast is that this will be completed by September 
2019. 
DCB 0129 & DCB 0160 Implementation Guidance:  A variant of the “how to guide” will 
be published and will support interpretation of the hazard identification requirements 
in the 2 CRM standards.  This will be hosted at the following websites: 
https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/information-standards/information-
standards-and-data-collections-including-extractions/publications-and-
notifications/standards-and-collections/dcb0129-clinical-risk-management-its-
application-in-the-manufacture-of-health-it-systems &  
https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/information-standards/information-
standards-and-data-collections-including-extractions/publications-and-
notifications/standards-and-collections/dcb0160-clinical-risk-management-its-
application-in-the-deployment-and-use-of-health-it-systems 
Academic Paper: Explore the possibility and merit of writing a paper for publication. 
 
 SMART Requirements 
The requirements established at Section 4 to extend the capability of SMART to implement this 
framework need to be reviewed by the development team.  The principle aim of SMART is to 
provide an environment that supports CRM that aligns with the requirements of DCB 0129 & 
DCB 0160, instils rigour and traceability into the clinical risk management activities whilst 
reducing the burden of administrative and clerical work processes.  In this context, the hazard 
description framework adds rigour and establishes traceability between activities.  
 
 Independent Evaluation of the Ontology 
The workshop evaluation (Section 5.4) demonstrated that the framework could be successfully 
applied in circumstances where the care-pathway is supported by a representative model and 
a SWIFT approach to hazard identification is followed.  Further work is required, beyond that 
undertaken by the author at Section 4, to demonstrate that hazard descriptions can be 
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established by using the ontology in scenarios where there is no model to articulate the care-
pathway and/or other hazard identification techniques are used. 
 Structured English Framework 
Consideration to be given to developing a formal framework with the use of structured 
language and a subset of descriptive terms.  Whilst this would have benefit in improving 
consistency of practice and introducing uniformity into the domain, it would have to 
considered in the context of the domain being relatively immature in safety management 
competency and operating outside of a regulatory framework (i.e. no mechanism to enforce 
it).  There is a danger that too much prescription may disengage safety practitioners. 
 
 Application in Other Domains 
Although the framework was specifically devised to support definition of health IT related 
hazards the potential to apply it in other safety related and safety critical domains should be 
explored.  However, the domain of health IT differs from many others in one key area i.e. that 
the hazardous outcome (patient harm) occurs through the direct actions of people; there is no 
interaction or integration between the technology and the patient.  Application of the 
framework to support risk management of MD seems to be a logical next step but, invariably, 
by definition MDs act as a point of actuation in the process of care management and delivery.  
Without pre-empting the outcome of such future work it is anticipated that some revision to 
the framework would be required.   
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Appendix A - Implemented Questionnaire 
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Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis in 
Health Informatics 
Part 1 About you (4 questions) 
 
 
 
Q1.1 Please state your Job Title 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q3.2 Please state time in your current role 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q1.3 Please state the nature of your role 
o Care professional (1)  
o Management (2)  
o Technical (3)  
o Other, please specify (4) ________________________________________________ 
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Q1.4 Please indicate if you are involved in any of the following activities 
▢ Specification of Health IT (1)  
▢ Procurement of Health IT (2)  
▢ Implementation & deployment Health IT (3)  
▢ Use of Health IT (4)  
▢ Maintenance of Health IT (5)  
▢ None of the above (6)  
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Part 2 Safety Standards and Clinical Risk Management Training (6 Questions) 
 
 
 
Q2.1 Are you aware of the mandated safety standard SCCI 0129? 
o Yes (1)  
o No (2)  
 
 
 
Q2.2 Are you aware of the mandated safety standard SCCI 0160? 
o Yes (1)  
o No (2)  
 
 
 
Q2.3 To what degree do you think your organisation is compliant with the relevant SCCI 
standard? If possible, please explain why  
o Fully compliant (1) ________________________________________________ 
o Partially compliant (2) ________________________________________________ 
o Not compliant (3) ________________________________________________ 
o Don't know (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q2.4 Are you aware that the SCCI standards establish the need for a Clinical Safety Officer 
(CSO)? 
o Yes (1)  
o No (2)  
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Q2.5 Do you know who fulfils the CSO role in your organisation? 
o Yes (1)  
o No (2)  
 
 
 
Q2.6 Please only answer if you act as a CSO 
Have you undertaken training in the principles of clinical risk management? 
o Yes (1)  
o No (2)  
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Part 3 Health Informatics Hazards (2 Questions) 
 
 
 
Q3.1 Please select the statement which best defines a hazard 
o An event or condition that results in harm (1)  
o Combination of probability of harm occurring and the significance of that harm (2)  
o An event or condition that has the potential to cause harm (3)  
 
 
 
Q3.2 Please classify the following as either a hazard cause, a hazard control, a hazard or an 
accident 
   
 Hazard Cause (1) Hazard Control (2) Hazard (3) Accident (4) 
Risk calculator 
gives incorrect 
rating (1)  o  o  o  o  
Dual checking of 
coding terms (2)  o  o  o  o  
Patient 
administered 
statins when not 
required (3)  
o  o  o  o  
Incorrect coding 
terms in HIT 
system (4)  o  o  o  o  
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Part 4 Health Informatics Hazard Identification (6 Questions) 
 
 
 
Q4.1 Please describe the purpose of hazard identification 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q4.2 Please list any hazard identification techniques that you use or have knowledge of 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q4.3 Do you or your organisation conduct hazard identification activities? 
o Yes, please go to Q4.4 (1)  
o No, please go to Q4.6 (2)  
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Q4.4 How would you describe your degree of competence in conducting hazard identification 
activities 
o Good competence (1)  
o Some competence (2)  
o No competence (3)  
 
 
 
Q4.5 How would you describe your degree of confidence in conducting hazard identification 
activities 
o Good confidence (1)  
o Some confidence (2)  
o No confidence (3)  
 
 
 
Q4.6 If you answered No to Q4.3 above please can you state why 
o Lack of awareness to do so (1)  
o Lack of skill to do so (2)  
o Lack of time to do so (3)  
o Other Reason (4) ________________________________________________ 
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Part 5  
Health Informatics Risk Analysis (6 Questions) 
 
 
 
Q5.1 Please describe the purpose of risk analysis 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q5.2 Please list any risk analysis techniques that you use or have knowledge of 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q5.3 Do you or your organisation conduct risk analysis activities? 
o Yes, please go to Q5.4 (1)  
o No, please go to Q5.6 (2)  
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Q5.4 How would you describe your degree of competence in conducting risk analysis activities 
o Good competence (1)  
o Some competence (2)  
o No competence (3)  
 
 
 
Q5.5 How would you describe your degree of confidence in conducting risk analysis 
o Good confidence (1)  
o Some confidence (2)  
o No confidence (3)  
 
 
 
Q5.6 If you answered No to Q5.3 above please can you state why 
o Lack of awareness to do so (1)  
o Lack of skill to do so (2)  
o Lack of time to do so (3)  
o Other Reason (4) ________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B – Legacy Hazard Review 
Application of the framework to a set of legacy hazards is provided here: 
 
Legacy hazard 
review.xlsx
 
Acute Care Setting Hazards 
 
Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name (from 
HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential 
Clinical Impact 
(from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
                  
ACT1-
1 
System 
failure 
GP's unable to 
book due to 
system failure 
Delay in 
patients 
agreeing 
appointments 
Y Y Y N System failure results in 
practitioner not being able to 
review and subsequently book 
patient's preferred referral 
service (location, date and 
time).   Patient may 
experience a delay in their 
care management and a 
subsequent deterioration in 
their condition. 
ACT1-
2 
Delayed 
Messaging 
Delayed MCCI 
message 
Patient turns up 
on the day 
planned through 
Choose & Book 
but finds has no 
appointment. 
Y Y Y N Delayed messaging results in 
secondary care appointment 
not being available at time the 
patient assumed.  Patient may 
experience a delay in their 
care management whilst a 
alternative appointment is 
booked and a subsequent 
deterioration in their condition. 
ACT1-
3 
Appointment 
slot issue 
(ASI) 
If no slots are 
available (due to 
System 
Unavailability) in 
the patients 
chosen service 
they will be added 
to the Choose & 
Book ASI 
worklist. 
Patient will not 
know 
immediately the 
date for their 
appointment. 
Y Y Y N System failure results in 
practitioner not being able to 
review and subsequently book 
patient's preferred referral 
service (location, date and 
time).   Patient may 
experience a delay in their 
care management and a 
subsequent deterioration in 
their condition. 
ACT1-
4 
Certification 
expired 
Failure to renew 
Provider 
Certificate. 
Patients and 
GPs unable to 
book via the 
Choose & Book 
System. 
Potential delay 
in treatment 
though likely 
that alternative 
referral would 
be used for 
urgent cases. 
Y Y Y N Expired certificate results in an 
inability to book a secondary 
care appointment.  Patient 
may experience a delay in 
their care management and a 
subsequent deterioration in 
their condition. 
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Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name (from 
HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential 
Clinical Impact 
(from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
ACT1-
5 
System 
Unplanned 
Downtime 
Unforeseen 
downtime of 
System 
Patients and 
GPs unable to 
book via the 
Choose & Book 
System. 
Potential delay 
in treatment 
though likely 
that alternative 
referral would 
be used for 
urgent cases. 
Y Y Y N Unplanned system down-time 
results in an inability to book a 
secondary care appointment.  
Patient may experience a 
delay in their care 
management and a 
subsequent deterioration in 
their condition. 
ACT1-
6 
Potential for 
unknown 
impact on 
existing 
System 
functionality 
Unforeseen 
effects on System 
linked to queue 
processes. 
Effect across 
the totality of 
System 
N Y N N   
ACT1-
7 
Unable to 
obtain NHS 
Number for 
the mother’s 
record 
There is no 
antenatal record 
for the mother 
and unable to 
obtain NHS 
number 
Can't complete 
baby 
registration 
Y Y N N Mother's health record is not 
available which means baby's 
birth cannot be 
registered.  Baby may miss 
subsequent screening and 
testing.  Conditions such as 
cystic fibrosis may go 
undetected and baby's health 
subsequently deteriorates 
ACT1-
8 
Birth 
Notification 
Data 
inaccurate 
Birth Notification 
Data information 
within the 
maternity system 
inaccurate. 
Inappropriate or 
missing care 
administered to 
the baby based 
on incorrect 
birth notification 
details. 
N Y Y N   
ACT1-
9 
Duplicate 
baby 
records 
created 
Duplicate baby 
records created 
If duplicate 
record exist for 
one baby, the 
HCP may 
provide 
treatment based 
on incomplete 
information  
N N Y N Data migration process results 
in duplicate baby records 
being created.  HCP may 
subsequently manage care 
based on incomplete medical 
record (other duplicate is more 
up to date).  Baby's health 
could deteriorate. 
ACT1-
10 
Confused 
record 
NHS number 
manually entered 
incorrectly or 
entered against 
the wrong patient 
record 
Subsequent 
care given to 
mother or baby 
could be 
inappropriate or 
missing e.g. 
Health visitor 
has wrong 
address details 
for baby or 
mother 
Y Y Y N Data administration error 
results in a confused health 
record.  Patient is 
administered care that is not 
appropriate to their condition 
and may experience a 
subsequent deterioration in 
their condition or an adverse 
reaction. 
ACT1-
11 
Connectivity 
to spine 
failure - 
spine 
unavailable 
HCP unable to 
use the system 
Delay in 
obtaining NHS 
Number 
Delay in 
registering birth 
Y Y N N Inability to communicate with 
Spine results in user being 
unable to a create a NHS 
number for the baby and 
register the birth.  Routine 
screening programmes may 
be missed and the baby may 
subsequently suffer health 
conditions that would 
otherwise be detected. 
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Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name (from 
HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential 
Clinical Impact 
(from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
ACT1-
12 
Unplanned 
downtime of 
System 
HCP unable to 
use the system 
Delay in 
obtaining NHS 
Number 
Delay in 
registering birth 
Y Y N N Unplanned downtime of 
system results in user being 
unable to a create a NHS 
number for the baby and 
register the birth.  Routine 
screening programmes may 
be missed and the baby may 
subsequently suffer health 
conditions that would 
otherwise be detected 
ACT1-
13 
Certificate 
expired 
Failure to renew 
Provider 
Certificate. 
Delay in 
obtaining NHS 
Number 
Y Y N N   
 
Acute Care Setting Hazards 
Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name 
(from HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential Clinical 
Impact (from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
                  
ACT2-1   Unable to 
access the 
relevant 
prescription 
and/or medicine 
administration 
record. 
Unable to manage 
care appropriately, 
there is potential 
delay in patient 
care. 
N Y Y N System outage results in 
previous medical history not 
being available to support 
current prescribing activity.  
Patient is prescribed medication 
which they are allergic to and 
consequently suffer a reaction. 
ACT2-2   Unable to view, 
enter or save 
clinical 
information into 
the Prescription 
and/or Medicine 
Administration 
solution. 
Where information 
is not available for 
later consultation 
this may delay 
access to care. 
N Y Y N   
ACT2-3   Corrupt 
information is 
stored in the 
record. 
Corrupted 
information in a 
prescription and/or 
administration can 
lead to delays in 
care in two ways: 
- Information is not 
available to 
support future 
activity 
- Corrupted 
information may 
be presented in a 
fashion that 
confuses or is 
ambiguous 
leading to a delay 
in care or 
inappropriate care 
being given. 
N Y Y N High administrative workload 
results in erroneous patient data 
entry.  HCP may subsequently 
manage care based on 
incomplete medical record. 
Patient's' health could 
deteriorate. 
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Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name 
(from HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential Clinical 
Impact (from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
ACT2-4   Patient 
prescription 
and/or medicine 
administration 
details appear 
on incorrect 
patient record - 
confused 
prescription/medi
cine 
administration 
records created. 
Data may be 
saved against an 
incorrect patient 
record. This 
results in clinicians 
working with 
incomplete or 
inaccurate 
information.  This 
may lead to 
inappropriate care 
being given.  
Y Y Y N Data administration error results 
in a confused health record.  
Patient is administered care that 
is not appropriate to their 
condition and may experience a 
subsequent deterioration in their 
condition or an adverse reaction. 
ACT2-5   Demographic or 
administrative 
information is 
presented in a 
manner that is 
confusing or 
open to 
misinterpretation
. 
If the clinician is 
unable to 
positively identify 
the record, or an 
element of the 
record, as 
belonging to their 
patient it is 
possible that 
inappropriate care 
will be given to the 
patient. 
N Y Y N   
ACT2-6   Clinical 
information is 
presented in a 
manner that is 
confusing or 
open to 
misinterpretation
. 
The clinician may 
base care events 
upon information 
presented to them 
from the clinical 
record.  Confusing 
or misleading 
information may 
result in 
inappropriate care 
being given. 
Where clinical 
information 
generates alerts or 
notifications the 
lack of these may 
result in actual 
harm. 
This may result in 
the 
misinterpretation 
of data and could 
lead to 
inappropriate care. 
N Y Y N Use this as an example where 
hazard description is confused. 
ACT2-7   Corrected/Additi
onal data not 
displayed/record
ed correctly.  
The clinical record 
is the foundation 
of communication 
between clinical 
professionals.  
Inaccurate or 
missing 
information may 
result in 
inappropriate care 
being given e.g. 
patient may 
receive incorrect 
medicine, resulting 
harm to patient. 
N Y Y Y   
P a g e  113 | 154 
 
Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name 
(from HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential Clinical 
Impact (from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
ACT2-8   Hard or soft copy 
of the 
prescription for 
communication 
is not completed 
fully or 
accurately. 
Incomplete or 
inaccurate clinical 
communication 
may lead to a 
delay in ongoing 
care or 
inappropriate care 
being given. 
N Y Y N Failure to record prescription 
details correctly results in 
incomplete clinical 
communication between HCPs.  
The patient may experience a 
delay in care e.g.  patient may 
receive incorrect medicine, 
resulting harm to patient. 
ACT2-9   Unable to create, 
print or transmit 
a clinical 
communication.  
Communication 
between care 
givers is vital if 
continuity of care 
is to be effective.  
The lack of ability 
to pass that 
information may 
result in a delay or 
loss of care 
activity. 
N Y Y N   
ACT2-
10 
  Prescribing 
inaccurately 
calculates dose. 
Patient/Child may 
receive toxic 
doses of drugs 
because of 
incorrect 
calculations or 
receive a non 
therapeutic dose if 
calculation is too 
low.  
N Y N Y Erroneous dose calculator 
results in increased dosage 
instructions being presented 
which the prescriber adheres to 
and the patient is subsequently 
administered a toxic level of 
medication. 
ACT2-
11 
  The manner and 
frequency of 
presentation or 
failure to display 
an alert or 
consistency in 
icons, may result 
in high risk alerts 
being missed.  
Patient treatment 
may be 
compromised by 
not noticing an 
alert. 
Y Y Y N Poor system interface results in 
high risk alerts going un-noticed.  
Patient treatment is 
compromised and patient suffers 
side effect. 
ACT2-
12 
  Clinical 
Information 
validation ranges 
are 
inappropriate. 
Where the clinical 
information 
validation range is 
inappropriate an 
inexperienced 
clinician may give 
inappropriate care 
on the basis of this 
information. 
N Y Y N Drug dictionary errors result in 
incorrect validation ranges being 
established.  An inexperienced 
clinician may administer 
inappropriate care and the 
patient's condition deteriorates. 
ACT2-
13 
  Fields with 
automatically 
precompleted 
entries could 
lead to incorrect 
clinical 
information 
being recorded. 
Where incorrect 
clinical information 
is recorded it is 
possible that 
inappropriate care 
may be given.   
N Y Y N Database design errors result in 
precompleted entries being 
populated with incorrect 
information.  Incorrect care 
management decisions made 
and patient's condition 
deteriorates. 
ACT2-
14 
  Clinical Message 
Failure  or error. 
Messages that are 
faulty or do not 
arrive may cause 
a delay in care.   
y N Y N   
ACT2-
15 
  System use is 
not as 
recommended. 
Depends on what 
the inappropriate 
use consists of. 
N Y N N   
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Acute Care Setting Hazards 
 
Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name (from 
HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential Clinical 
Impact (from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
                  
ACT3-1   Duplicate patient 
records are 
loaded into PAS 
when loading and 
converting 
patient record 
data from the 
organisation’s 
legacy system. 
If duplicate patient 
records exist in an 
organisation’s 
implementation of 
PAS, then clinical 
information from 
one record might 
not be available in 
the second record. 
Y Y N N Duplicate patient record is 
created which results in 
incomplete clinical hoistory in 
record being used at the point 
of care.  Individual patient's 
care maybe compromised or 
suboptimal resulting a 
deterioration in their health. 
ACT3-2   A user does not 
enter sufficient 
search criteria in 
PAS to locate an 
existing patient 
record and 
creates a new, 
duplicate patient 
record. 
If duplicate patient 
records exist in an 
organisation’s 
implementation of 
PAS, then clinical 
information from 
one record might 
not be available in 
the second record. 
        This essentially is another 
cause to ACT3-1 ; this level of 
detailed should be addressed in 
the analysis of ACT3-1 rather 
than through the management 
of another hazard. 
ACT3-3   A patient cannot 
be identified by 
healthcare staff 
and is unable to 
confirm their 
own identity 
(e.g., unconscious 
and lacking ID), 
and staff create a 
new, duplicate 
patient record. 
If duplicate patient 
records exist in an 
organisation’s 
implementation of 
PAS, then clinical 
information from 
one record might 
not be available in 
the second record. 
        As above 
ACT3-4   A duplicate 
patient record 
could be created 
in PAS if an 
appointment is 
scheduled 
through a third-
party scheduling 
system (e.g., CAB) 
and that system 
has a different 
NHS number 
associated with 
the patient's 
record than is 
associated with 
the patient's 
record in PAS. 
If duplicate patient 
records exist in an 
organisation’s 
implementation of 
PAS, then clinical 
information from 
one record might 
not be available in 
the second record. 
        As above 
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Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name (from 
HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential Clinical 
Impact (from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
ACT3-
5 
  User error when 
registering a 
newborn or new 
patient: when 
performing a 
PDS trace, user 
selects the 
wrong patient 
from the options 
returned from 
the PDS. 
A key patient 
identifier (e.g., NHS 
number) that 
should be assigned 
to Patient “B” in  
PAS could instead 
be assigned to a 
different Patient 
“A.” 
 
If Patient A’s record 
is updated in  PAS, 
those changes 
might result in 
unintended 
updates to Patient 
B’s record in an 
interfaced third-
party system that 
uses the patient 
identifier (e.g., 
demographics 
changes for Patient 
A in  PAS might be 
associated with 
Patient B in PDS). 
 
If Patient B's record 
is updated in an 
interfaced third-
party system that 
uses the patient 
identifier, those 
changes might 
result in 
unintended 
updates to Patient 
A’s record in  PAS. 
(e.g., CAB 
appointment 
placed for Patient B 
might be associated 
with Patient A in  
PAS).  
Y Y N N Patient is mis-identified which 
results in another patient's 
record being updated. 
Incomplete or wrong patient 
record is used at the point of 
care.  Individual patient's care 
maybe compromised or 
suboptimal resulting a 
deterioration in their health. 
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Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name (from 
HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential Clinical 
Impact (from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
ACT3-6   User error when 
registering a 
new-born or new 
patient: incorrect 
information is 
entered into  
PAS. 
A key patient 
identifier (e.g., NHS 
number) that 
should be assigned 
to Patient “B” in  
PAS could instead 
be assigned to a 
different Patient 
“A.” 
 
If Patient A’s record 
is updated in  PAS, 
those changes 
might result in 
unintended 
updates to Patient 
B’s record in an 
interfaced third-
party system that 
uses the patient 
identifier (e.g., 
demographics 
changes for Patient 
A in  PAS might be 
associated with 
Patient B in PDS). 
 
If Patient B's record 
is updated in an 
interfaced third-
party system that 
uses the patient 
identifier, those 
changes might 
result in 
unintended 
updates to Patient 
A’s record in  PAS. 
(e.g., CAB 
appointment 
placed for Patient B 
might be associated 
with Patient A in  
PAS).  
         See notes at ACT3-2; this is 
essentially another cause to 
ACT3-5 
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Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name (from 
HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential Clinical 
Impact (from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
ACT3-7   A user incorrectly 
merges two 
unique patient 
records in  PAS. 
A key patient 
identifier (e.g., NHS 
number) that 
should be assigned 
to Patient “B” in  
PAS could instead 
be assigned to a 
different Patient 
“A.” 
 
If Patient A’s record 
is updated in  PAS, 
those changes 
might result in 
unintended 
updates to Patient 
B’s record in an 
interfaced third-
party system that 
uses the patient 
identifier (e.g., 
demographics 
changes for Patient 
A in  PAS might be 
associated with 
Patient B in PDS). 
 
If Patient B's record 
is updated in an 
interfaced third-
party system that 
uses the patient 
identifier, those 
changes might 
result in 
unintended 
updates to Patient 
A’s record in  PAS. 
(e.g., CAB 
appointment 
placed for Patient B 
might be associated 
with Patient A in  
PAS).  
         As above 
 
Patient Facing Services (Primary Care) Hazards 
Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name (from 
HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential Clinical 
Impact (from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
                  
APP1-
1 
PFS 
services 
unavailable 
The patient 
cannot access 
Patient Facing 
Services 
Unable to book 
appointment or 
order repeat 
prescriptions, 
especially true for 
deaf / mute 
patients 
N Y Y N Patient Facing Services are not 
available which results in 
patients being unable to order 
repeat medications.  Patient 
suffers a delay in receiving 
medications and their condition 
deteriorates. 
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Hazard 
Id 
Hazard 
Name (from 
HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential Clinical 
Impact (from HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
APP1-
2 
Information 
presented in 
confusing 
manner 
The patient 
record may be 
presented to 
the patient in 
a confusing 
manner with 
such as text 
wrapping 
inappropriate, 
text truncation 
etc. 
This would make 
could make 
information 
presented difficult 
to read and could 
lead to incorrect 
prescription being 
selected, 
appointments etc. 
N Y Y N Poor App interface design 
results in patient's information 
being presented in a confusing 
manner.  Patient subsequently 
makes a mistake (e.g. select 
wrong repeat medication) and 
their condition continues to 
deteriorate 
APP1-
3 
Hidden 
information 
Displayed 
Information 
recorded in 
the clinical 
system 
marked as 
hidden is 
visible to the 
patient or 
proxy 
psychological 
trauma /upset 
N Y N Y Flaw in app interface design 
results in data that is marked as 
hidden in clinical record not 
being masked.  Hidden data 
becomes visible to patient who 
suffers psychological trauma 
/upset 
APP1-
4 
Incorrect 
appointment 
booked 
The patient 
selects an 
appointment 
but incorrect 
appointment 
or 
appointment 
type booked 
at practice 
Possible delay to 
care /diagnosis 
where patient 
attend practice at 
wrong time and 
cannot be seen 
N Y Y N App design results in a patient 
being unable to book 
appointment. Patient 
experiences a delay in 
accessing care and their 
existing condition worsens. 
APP1-
5 
Appointment 
double 
booked 
Multiple 
patients try to 
book the 
same 
appointment 
Possible delay to 
care /diagnosis 
where patient 
attends practice 
but cannot be 
seen 
N Y Y N This is a variant of AP1-4 and it 
is suggested that it could be 
managed under the same 
scenario 
APP1-
6 
Appointment 
not booked 
The Patient 
requests an 
appointment 
but it is not 
booked 
Possible delay to 
care / diagnosis 
where patient 
attends practice 
but cannot be 
seen 
N Y Y N  As AP1-5 
APP1-
7 
Prescription 
not available 
The Patient 
requests a 
repeat 
prescription 
but not 
available for 
collection 
Delay to 
prescription 
N Y Y N App design results in a repeat 
prescription request not being 
actioned.  Patient experiences a 
delay in getting their repeat 
medication and their existing 
condition worsens. 
 
 
General observation:  Review of this HL has highlighted that the manufacture of the app has not 
considered the causes of the hazards identified.  Without understanding the causes, no 
meaningful risk assessment and evaluation can be undertaken.  Inspection of the safety case 
(the formal review of which falls outside the scope of this research) illustrates that the 
manufacturer appeals to the availability of other business processes e.g. patient phoning GP 
surgery when app is not available as mitigation.  This is disappointing as it illustrates that the 
manufacturer has not documented any consideration of potential failure modes of their 
technology and how these have been mitigated through development processes.) 
PFS: Patient Facing Services: 
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Prescribing Hazards 
 
Hazard 
Id 
Hazard Name 
(from HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential 
Clinical 
Impact (from 
HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
                  
PCP1 Repeat 
templates could 
result in 
erroneous 
mapping 
between dm+d 
and prescribing 
system 
Repeat 
templates and 
changes to 
drug dictionary 
Wrong drug / 
form / dose on 
the 
prescription. 
This relates to 
data migration 
problems, i.e. 
data on repeat 
template does 
not match what 
is on the 
message.  
Y Y Y N   
PCP2 Old data in 
PMR, not using 
dm+d 
Repeat 
templates and 
changes to 
drug dictionary 
Unable to send 
an electronic 
prescription 
Y Y N N Data quality issues results in 
an inability to use electronic 
prescribing.  Patient 
experiences a delay in 
receiving medication and 
existing condition worsens.   
PCP3 PMR is using 
old dm+d data 
e.g. 
discontinued 
code, 
description etc 
Repeat 
templates and 
changes to 
drug dictionary 
Data on repeat 
template does 
not match what 
is in the 
message 
Y Y N N  It is unclear what the 
disruption would be to care 
process in this scenario. 
PCP4 Incorrect 
historical data 
as a result of 
incorrect data 
migration 
during 
implementation. 
Migration of 
existing data 
to dm+d could 
introduce 
errors 
Wrong drug / 
form / dose on 
the 
prescription, 
particularly in 
relation to units 
of measure.  
Y Y N N Transformation data errors 
introduced through data 
migration results in erroneous 
in prescription instructions.  
Patient is prescribed 
over/under dose and suffers 
unwanted side effects. 
PCP5 Incorrect dm+d 
mapping 
between the 
prescribing 
system & the 
dm+d 
Data provider 
incorrect 
Supplier use 
of third party 
data incorrect 
Errors due to 
deployment / 
configuration 
Mismatch of 
prescriber's 
intention to 
electronic 
prescription. 
Patient may 
receive 
incorrect drug. 
Note dose and 
frequency 
covered in risk 
5 
Y N Y N Incorrect mapping of dm+d 
terms to proprietary terms 
results in erroneous in 
selection of medicine different 
to that intended.  Patient is 
prescribed wrong medication 
and experiences unwanted 
side effects or reaction. 
 
Even in a HL hazards are 
referred to as risks 
  
PCP6 Incorrect dm+d 
mapping 
between the 
prescribing 
system & the 
dm+d - drugs 
Data provider 
incorrect 
Supplier use 
of third party 
data incorrect 
Errors due to 
deployment / 
configuration 
Mismatch of 
prescriber's 
intention to 
electronic 
prescription. 
Patient may 
receive 
incorrect drug. 
         Duplication of PCP5 
PCP7 Incorrect dm+d 
mapping 
between the 
prescribing 
system & the 
dm+d - forms 
Data provider 
incorrect 
Supplier use 
of third party 
data incorrect 
Errors due to 
deployment / 
configuration 
Mismatch of 
prescriber's 
intention to 
electronic 
prescription. 
Patient may 
receive 
incorrect form. 
        Duplication of PCP5 
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Hazard 
Id 
Hazard Name 
(from HL) 
Hazard 
Description 
(from HL) 
Potential 
Clinical 
Impact (from 
HL) 
C E H H Re-expressed Hazard 
Description 
PCP8 Incorrect dm+d 
mapping 
between the 
prescribing 
system & the 
dm+d - 
units/quantities 
Data provider 
incorrect 
Supplier use 
of third party 
data incorrect 
Errors due to 
deployment / 
configuration 
Mismatch of 
prescriber's 
intention to 
electronic 
prescription. 
Patient may 
receive 
incorrect 
dosage. 
        Duplication of PCP5 
PCP9 Electronic 
prescription is 
incorrect & not 
as the 
Prescriber 
intended. This 
error is not 
identified by the 
Prescriber. 
unfamiliarity/ 
lack of 
knowledge 
time pressure 
training 
workload 
system error 
prescriber 
error  
Patient has 
wrong 
prescription 
(dose, 
frequency, 
drug) and is 
reliant on the 
Dispenser to 
identify the 
problem. That 
is to say, 
electronic 
prescription not 
as intended. 
Y Y Y N   
PCP10 Dose is free 
text based not 
code based 
System design Some of the 
automatic 
Electronic 
Prescription 
Service (EPS) 
checking that 
takes place 
cannot be 
carried out. 
Y Y N N Free text dosage instructions 
means EPS safety checks 
cannot be undertaken Patient 
prescription has incorrect 
dosage instructions and 
patient suffers from under/ 
overdosing. 
PCP11 Cancellation 
request not 
sent/uploaded 
to the Spine. 
technical 
error. 
Consequences 
depend on the 
types of drug 
involved. 
Consequences 
could be worse 
if the GP thinks 
that a drug has 
been cancelled 
when there is a 
known allergy 
or contra-
indication. 
Y N Y N Cancellation request not sent 
to Spine which results in 
cancelled prescription 
reaching the pharmacy.  
Patient is dispensed 
medication that they should 
not have and experiences side 
effects or reaction 
PCP12 An electronic 
cancellation 
message 
cannot be sent 
(e.g. system 
failure or 
prescription has 
already been 
dispensed) and 
Receptionist 
does not 
communicate 
cancellation 
information to 
Pharmacy or 
patient prior to 
dispensing 
time pressure 
goal conflicts 
lack of clarity 
of roles and 
responsibilities 
Drug 
dispensed and 
may be taken 
by the patient 
before they are 
notified about 
the 
cancellation. 
        This is a repeat of above but 
with a different low-level 
cause.  This detail should 
emerge in the analysis of a 
common hazard to avoid 
duplication. 
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Appendix C - CSO Review 
The research paper is provided here: 
 
5.2%20Paper.docx
 
Research context 
The author’s perception is that the concept of hazard is not widely used / understood 
in the healthcare domain; the concept of risk is predominately used.  When 
considering the use of technology to support health care management and delivery, a 
risk often equates with a known issue, defect, bug or a dislike of the implementation.   
As a consequence, where used, hazard definitions can become unstructured and don’t 
necessarily capture the patient harm effect; predominantly they are described in 
causal terms e.g. “loss of N3 connection”  
The focus of the author’s research is to devise a methodology that can be used to 
address these observations and support practitioners in being able to define hazards 
that are patient centric and reflect the credible scenario from which patient harm may 
result. 
Considering the concept of a hazard definition, it can be broken down into two 
properties  
• Hazard Definition = Hazard Name (Identifier) + Hazard Description  
Hazard Name is not an important property if it is simply thought of as 
means to establish a unique identifier for a particular hazard e.g. Haz 
001. 
Hazard Description is the key property.  It needs to describe the 
prevailing condition from which credible patient harm could materialise 
and what could cause or contribute to the prevailing condition  
Research Proposal - Devise a linguistic framework that provides constructs which will 
support the expression of meaningful and context relevant hazards 
Information, people and technology 
The patient safety consequences of using health IT cannot be considered by simply focusing on 
the technology in isolation.  There is a need to take a holistic view, considering patient harm 
effects in the context of health informatics (HI) failures or flaws.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
concept of HI i.e. the integration and interdependency that exists between people, technology 
and information in the support of care management:   
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Figure 1 – Health informatics concept 
The nature of this integration and the influence each component has on others in a 
generic healthcare environment is illustrated at Figure 2 
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Figure 2 – HI Architecture 
 
Hazards as (dis)benefits 
Business management benefits 
Benefits management principles establish key linguist constructs that are concatenated to 
form a meaningful expression of the benefit scenario: 
 
Action: that which is done to initiate a change in real world state 
Change: that which is new following the action 
Outcome: the result of the change 
P a g e  123 | 154 
 
Benefit: the advantage that the recipient gains 
 
The effectiveness of this can be readily recognised in the following healthcare specific 
example: 
 
Replacing the multiple systems that are currently in use with a single system will mean 
that health care staff will only need to log onto 1 system to find all the information 
they need.  The log-on process will be quicker, releasing sufficient time for staff to see 
an additional patient during the course of clinic thereby reducing patient waiting 
times. 
 
Benefits and harm events can be considered to be similar in that both have an impact on the 
user of the system or service and both occur following a change in the environment in which 
they exist.  Whilst benefits are purposefully generated by initiating deliberate and specific 
actions, harm events occur as a consequence of some unwanted or unintended action being 
initiated. 
By considering the definition of these four elements, an equivalence can be made to terms 
that are typically used to describe an accident sequence 
• Action (n) The fact or process of doing something, typically to achieve an aim  
o Equates to a hazard cause 
• Change (n) An act or process through which something becomes different 
o Equates to an effect in the hazard scenario 
• Outcome (n): The way a thing turns out; a consequence  
o Equates to the hazard itself  
• Benefit (n) An advantage or profit gained from something  
o Equates to the patient harm event 
This framework can be integrated into the HI Architecture as depicted at Figure 2 to 
illustrate the context in which the linguistic elements exist, Figure 3.   A key 
consideration in the domain of HI is the role of the practitioner.  They are the 
“actuator” and administer care, taking into consideration the information they share 
with technology and the demands placed on them by the care environment.  By using 
colours, it is clear in which particular context the linguist elements become relevant: 
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Figure 3 – Context of linguistic constructs 
By considering and combining these constructs a harm event ontology can be 
established that identifies the key elements of an effective hazard description and the 
relationships between them. This is illustrated graphically at Figure 4.  
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￼ 
Figure 4 – Hazard description ontology  
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Example application 
 
Hazard 
Id 
 
Hazard 
Name (from 
HL) 
 
Hazard Description 
(from HL) 
 
Potential Clinical 
Impact (from HL) 
 
Re-expressed 
Hazard 
Description 
 
 Delayed 
Messaging 
 
Delayed MCCI 
message 
 
Patient turns up 
on the day 
planned through 
Choose & Book 
but finds has no 
appointment. 
 
Delayed 
messaging results 
in secondary care 
appointment not 
being available at 
time the patient 
assumed.  Patient 
may experience a 
delay in their 
care 
management and 
a subsequent 
deterioration in 
their condition. 
 
 
In this example, the hazard is clearly described in causal terms and whilst the HL provides the 
opportunity to summarise the patient care impact it simply summarises a change effect in the 
patients care pathway. 
Applying the framework enables a rich expression of the harm scenario to be articulated which 
in turn would support a more structured and justified risk assessment.  In this example, the re-
expressed hazard description still remains generic but could be readily amended to reflect the 
scenario in a specific care path way e.g. 2 week wait guidelines relating to cancer referrals. 
 
 
 
 
  
P a g e  127 | 154 
 
 
 
The blank feedback form is provided here: 
 
5.2%20Feedback%2
0form.docx
 
 
Question Y/N Comments 
Is the research observation 
regarding hazard definition 
in the domain of health 
informatics representative? 
 
 
 
 
  
Does the linguistic 
methodology proposed aid 
meaningful hazard 
definition?  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Are there any flaws or 
weakness in the proposed 
methodology? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Please express any other 
views or comments. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Do you give permission for 
your responses to be 
anomalously quoted within 
the scope of the thesis 
report? 
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Appendix D – Safety Conference 
Presentation 
The presentation is provided here: 
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Delegate feedback is provided here: 
 
5.3 Feedback.pdf
 
 
 Do you think 
the hazard 
definition 
technique 
supports 
meaningful 
description of 
Health IT 
related 
hazards? 
Please provide reasoning Do you think the 
hazard definition 
technique will be 
practical to use in 
a hazard 
workshop?  
Please provide reasoning 
1 Yes  Yes  
2 Yes  Yes  
3 Yes  Yes  
4 Yes  Yes  
5 Yes  Yes  
6 Not Answered  Not Answered  
7 Yes  Yes Though may in effect slow 
down the process while 
users get used to using the 
tool! 
8 Not Answered  Yes defining needs to be simple... 
this was 
9 Yes in principle, but if it could 
be tied in with actual 
examples. 
Yes  
10 Yes Hazards, causes, effects 
are frequently confused 
but the use of the tool 
should prevent this. 
Yes I think so but today we 
worked individually. 
11 Yes Allows causes and 
controls to be visualised 
which helps to show how 
they feed into care 
process. 
Yes Helps to fit into care process. 
12 No  No  
13 No  No  
14 Yes  Yes  
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 Do you think 
the hazard 
definition 
technique 
supports 
meaningful 
description of 
Health IT 
related 
hazards? 
Please provide reasoning Do you think 
the hazard 
definition 
technique will 
be practical to 
use in a hazard 
workshop?  
Please provide reasoning 
15 No do you mean the defining 
of the hazards within the 
tool? - if so, then i'd 
prefer to just use the 
hazard log 
No i was disapointed with this 
workshop - i had thought 
we would have spent more 
time on a safety case rather 
than on using a beta 
software not currently 
available to me that 
appears to take longer to 
formulate a hazard log 
entry than the current 
processes we use 
16 Yes  Yes Often hazards are not 
correctly identified 
17 Not Answered Don't know - haven't had 
a chance to properly try it 
yet. 
Not Answered Don't know - haven't had a 
chance to properly try it 
yet. 
18 Yes  Yes  
19 Yes  Yes  
20 No  No  
21 Not Answered  Not Answered  
22 Yes We discussed TIP? Yes  
23 Yes  Yes It will be helpful to help all 
involved to clarify hazards 
24 No No. It seems to be that it 
is mainly developed by IT 
employees. It think 
clinicians could have  
been involved in 
developing this SMART 
specially nurse clinicians. 
Yes  
25 Yes  Yes  
26 Yes  Yes  
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 Do you think 
the hazard 
definition 
technique 
supports 
meaningful 
description 
of Health IT 
related 
hazards? 
Please provide reasoning Do you think 
the hazard 
definition 
technique will 
be practical to 
use in a hazard 
workshop?  
Please provide reasoning 
27 Yes Yes, with the knowledge 
around safety engineering 
and how this is being 
translated over to 
healthcare this is an 
unknown for health care 
and gives structure to this 
element of the digital 
healthcare, re day 1. 
Yes Know your audience, initially 
participants did not want to 
do this, once started i heard 
people say they liked it. 
What is in it for me, show 
them the report first  
maybe and then this is how 
we get there.................. 
28 Yes Yes, but only in tightly 
defined care processes. 
Difficult for a supplier 
providing a generic form 
building capability to be 
used across healthcare. If 
a Healthcare Provider 
then had to assess each 
form they had built(using 
the form builder)  it would 
be a big overhead. 
Yes It would be practical for a 
workshop assessing smaller 
systems which support 
specific care processes that 
are well bounded. 
Assessment of a larger 
system like an EPR that 
supports many different 
clinical processes in multiple 
care settings in a generic 
way would require MANY 
such workshops. This would 
be too large an overhead. 
It may be suitable for 
upgrades if they introduce a 
new tightly bounded 
feature. 
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Appendix E – Safety Training Module 
The training module is provided here: 
 
5.5 Training 
Module.pdf
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Delegate feedback is provided here: 
 
5.5 Training 
Feedback.pdf
 
 Do you think the 
hazard 
description 
framework helps 
to establish 
meaningful 
hazard 
descriptions? 
Comments Do you think 
the hazard 
description 
framework 
will be 
practical to 
use? 
Comments 
1 Yes Interesting and helpful 
definition of a hazard but a bit 
different from the Bow Tie 
concept which is a potential 
harm to a patient. Both 
concepts have their strengths 
and I think the important thing 
is to have a clear definition 
which is then used consistently 
throughout the risk 
management work-flow 
 Yes  
2 Yes  Yes Only really for smaller 
projects. 
3 Yes  Yes  
4 Yes  Yes  
5 Yes  Yes  
6 Yes It helps to break it down in to  
understandable and practical 
steps as I think hazard and risk 
plus impact can be confusing 
Yes  
7 Not Answered Possibly- would need to apply 
it to my own examples to see if 
it andds any value. 
Not Answered Might be difficult to get to this 
granular detail on bigger 
projects- but maybe that’s 
where  
8 Yes We didn't really have a lot of 
time to discuss this as we were 
rushing at the end.  
I know that I sometimes have 
to spend time re-framing a 
hazard - I can see that  
Yes the Agile approach would 
help? But be aware that people 
will 'adjust' it to fit their 
workflows and mindsets. 
However, keeping the basics in 
mind when writing  
9 Yes I found it easy to follow and the 
colour coded element 
simplified the process. 
Yes  
10 Not Answered  Not Answered I had to leave as the session 
started later than planned so   
11 Yes Yes because so many people in 
project teams and front line 
care still don't know the 
difference between Risk, issue, 
hazard, incident etc 
Yes  
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 Do you think the 
hazard 
description 
framework helps 
to establish 
meaningful 
hazard 
descriptions? 
Comments Do you think 
the hazard 
description 
framework 
will be 
practical to 
use? 
Comments 
12 Yes  Yes  
13 Yes Unfortunately, this presentation 
came at the end of the day and 
time was running out so felt a 
little rushed. 
Yes  
14 Yes  Yes I will be spending some time 
trying to incorporate the 
framework into my assessment 
of hazards and risks. 
 I would appreciate receiving 
the  
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Abbreviations 
A&E Accident and Emergency 
CRM Clinical Risk Management 
CSO Clinical Safety Officer 
DCB Data Coordination Board 
EPS Electronic Prescription Service 
EU European Union 
HCP HealthCare Practitioner 
HI Health Informatics 
HIT Health Information Technology 
IT Information Technology 
MD Medical Device 
MDD Medical Device Directive 
MDR Medical Device Regulation 
NEWS National Early Warning Score 
NHS National Health Service 
NPFiT National Programme for IT 
SCR Summary Care Record 
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Glossary of terms 
Term Definition Source of definition 
 
Care-pathway The organisation of care 
processes, care management 
decisions and resources need 
to support the care needs for 
a defined group of patients.  
 
This research, derived from 
(Vanhaecht, 2010) 
 
Cause An event or action that occurs 
in the care-pathway that by 
itself or in combination with 
other causes can result in the 
occurrence of harm.  A cause 
may reflect an intentional 
event/action or an 
unintended event/action. 
This research 
Clinical Risk Management  Systematic application of 
management policies, 
procedures and practices to 
the tasks of analysing, 
evaluating and controlling 
clinical risk 
DCB 0129 / DCB 0160 
Clinical Safety Officer Person in an organisation 
responsible for ensuring the 
safety of a Health IT System in 
that organisation through the 
application of clinical risk 
management. 
DCB 0129 / DCB 0160 
Effect The variation or deviation 
that is introduced into the 
care-pathway from what 
should be conducted to that 
which is conducted. 
This research 
Harm Death, physical injury, 
psychological trauma and/or 
damage to the health or well-
being of a patient. 
DCB 0129 / DCB 0160 
Harm-scenario A representation of those 
events that could occur in the 
care-pathway (either 
intentionally or 
unintentionally) that could 
credibly result in harm to a 
patient who is being managed 
on the care-pathway. 
This research 
Hazard Potential source of harm to a 
patient. 
DCB 0129 / DCB 0160 
P a g e  149 | 154 
 
Term Definition Source of definition 
 
Hazard Identification Process of identifying and 
documenting known and 
foreseeable hazards to 
patients in both normal and 
fault conditions 
DCB 0129 / DCB 0160 
Risk Combination of the severity 
of harm to a patient and the 
likelihood of occurrence of 
that harm. 
DCB 0129 / DCB 0160 
Risk Evaluation Process of evaluating whether 
the hazard risk is acceptable.  
Adapted from  
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